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ABSTRACT

Over the past several decades, the secondary market system has evolved into a more
complex and fragmented system than it once was. The Investor’s Exchange (IEX) emerged
in 2014 in rebellion of purportedly unethical High-Frequency Trading (HFT) behaviors in
the markets. Using a novel, proprietary model for trade matching along with providing
other services, the IEX has become a respectable player in the market system that prides
itself on transparency and fairness. This paper explores the role that IEX has played in
market fragmentation since its inception using empirical and historical analysis. The
empirical analysis focuses primarily on a recent two-year time period spanning from
August 13th, 2018 through August 13th, 2020. Using difference in means tests this paper
makes comparisons between the IEX and NYSE American, the two most reputable “speed
bump” models. Additionally, using ordinary least-squares regressions this paper does an
extensive analysis of predictors of volume and market share. In-depth review of existing
literature offers further insight about the IEX and its relationship to trends in market
microstructure. I find that the IEX has been effective in deterring HFT behavior. This
research supports the theory of a single market with multiple entry points described by
O’Hara & Ye (2011) by highlighting how the IEX has become its own unique entry point
for a well-connected market system.
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PREFACE/FOREWORD

Writing a thesis has been the most difficult thing I have ever done in my life.
More than just being difficult, it has been particularly humbling. Through the 100’s of
hours I have poured into this, my greatest fear has been answering a huge question about
market microstructure. With the insight I now have, I realize that it is a rare and powerful
thing for someone to use research to discover something revolutionary. I have
continuously put pressure on myself to make this an exceptional contribution to the
literature. The pressure I have put on myself has been so great that it both nearly broke
me and nearly prevented the completion of my research. Trying to make this research a
profound contribution distracted me from the fact that a contribution of any size is all it
needs to be. My hope now is that this paper is part of the big picture of the fragmented
market system and one day helps others learn more about the finance industry.
The equity market is one of the most delicate and important systems in our world.
From retail investors all the way up to hedge fund managers, changes in the market can
change peoples lives. This is what makes this research so important. The IEX started, and
is part of, a huge trend of continued fragmentation of the market system. As the market
system changes, people’s lives also stand to be changed either implicitly or explicitly.
The market matters because people matter. The market changes because people are
different and because people also change. The truth behind finance, and this paper, is that
human behavior is what underlies much of what we study.
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CHAPTER I

MARKET FRAGMENTATION

Overview
For years the secondary market system in the finance industry has been evolving
into a prolific environment of exchanges, institutions, traders, brokers, and regulators.
Around the year 1995, this same market system was predominantly made up of only 5
exchanges that each operated with analogous functions in relation to each other. In the
United States there are currently 29 national securities exchanges available for trading
stocks and options as well as 61 ATS exchanges1. This proliferation of exchanges can be
attributed in theory to a diverse range of sources and long history of market microstructure
evolution (O’Hara, 1996; O’Hara & Ye, 2011). The evolution of market microstructure is
a dynamic blend of innovation, regulation, and interaction within and surrounding the
markets themselves.
Many different changes in the financial securities market environment have
contributed to the current status of market fragmentation for the system as a whole2. These
trends have spread not only throughout domestic markets but can also be seen abroad
(Gresse, 2017; O’Hara & Ye, 2011). The history of market fragmentation in the United
States was a precursor to the formation of the IEX and the IEX is now a unique part of the
fragmented market system. This chapter analyzes much of the theoretical and empirical

1

Taken from official SEC lists of exchanges and ATS’s. The list of SEC sanctioned exchanges can be
found at: https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/divisionsmarketregmrexchangesshtml.html & the list of SEC
sanctioned ATS’s can be found at: https://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/atslist.htm
2
See Appendix A for more information on the history of market fragmentation
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work in market microstructure that relates to the fragmentation of the equity market in the
U.S. and abroad.
Radiation within the Market System
For a quarter of a century, the securities’ market system has been categorized by
rapid and novel change. An obvious and intuitive source of this expansion and evolution is
the digital revolution (Hendershott et al., 2011), but the academic community has continued
to identify other relevant sources. In the past 4 years alone, the number of stock and options
exchanges has increased by 4, and 21 new SEC-sanctioned ATS exchanges have
emerged3.As these changes have occurred, a large portion of volume has moved to offexchange venues since the admission of Reg NMS (Kwan et al., 2015; O’Hara & Ye,
2011).
With this rapid expansion there has been noticeable increases in competition
between exchanges and between market participators(Boehmer et al., 2018; Hens et al.,
2018; Wang, 2018). Bessembinder & Kaufman (1997) and Bennett & Wei (2006) discuss
some of the costs to the increased levels of competition while many others have identified
some of the benefits (Aitken et al., 2017; de Fontnouvelle et al., 2006; O’Hara & Ye, 2011).
All the while, regulators have attempted to stay on top of protecting a fair market
environment.
Regulation NMS was a huge tipping point for the fragmentation of equities markets
(Aitken et al., 2017; Kwan et al., 2015; O’Hara & Ye, 2011; Woodward, 2018). In order
for the IEX to become an exchange, the SEC had to grant an exception to Reg NMS4 due

3

Calculated using current values in comparison to a count done by author Matt Turner in a web article for
Business Insider. This article can be found at https://www.businessinsider.com/firm58-graphic-on-stockmarket-fragmentation-2016-3
4
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/17/sec-gives-its-blessing-to-the-iexs-speed-bump-trading.html
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to its new technical innovation: the access delay5. This is largely why the entrance of the
IEX had such a profound impact on fragmentation. Not only that, but the new change to
Reg NMS allowed for the entrance of NYSE American, the IntelligentCross dark pool, and
other access delay venues making the market even more fragmented.
New competition between venues in the equity market has continued and evolved
since the IEX emerged. In 2020 alone, the SEC granted exchange membership to two new
exchanges: The Member’s Exchange (MEMX) and the Long-Term Stock Exchange
(LTSE). Both exchanges have mirrored the extensive effort from the IEX to brand
themselves into a specific niche within the equity market system. Ironically, there is
indication that the entry of MEMX has been a competitive response to the IEX and other
venues. Similar to the critique assigned to the BATS exchange in Flash Boys, MEMX has
received direct support from virtually all prominent market maker institutions known to
participate heavily in Algorithmic trading, and potentially HFT behavior. In fact, one
analyst even referred to the exchange as “Bats 2.0” in a Financial Times article6. There is
a considerable likelihood that MEMX could use attractive fee structures to acquire market
share so that supporting institutions can capitalize on that market share using HFT or other
methods.
Changes in fragmentation have grown to show the signs of the evolutionary
principle of adaptive radiation. As more changes arise in the market, there is potential that
the theory of a single market with multiple entry points presented by O’Hara & Ye (2011)
could be challenged if increased fragmentation undermines the functions of Reg NMS.

5

Also referred to as a “speed bump” because it was designed to deter HFT behavior
https://www-proquest-com.wv-o-ursus-proxy02.ursus.maine.edu/docview/2165970117?pqorigsite=summon
6
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Beyond that, there is risk that predatory behavior could emerge due to a regulatory lag on
top of existing risks such as flash crashes, deterioration of market quality, or other trends.
Ultimately, it is difficult to predict what the ideal balance of consolidation versus
fragmentation is best. The conclusions of Mendelson (1987) how theoretical analyses of
different market organization to be comparable in quality, but in the presence of trading
algorithms makes the future of the markets look like they will be fragmented for the
foreseeable future.
Market Quality
New derivations of traders and strategies emerged in tandem with changes in the
market system. These changes have had impacts on market quality. The degree and
direction of each of these impacts is somewhat debated, but the general consensus is that
market fragmentation improves market quality (Aitken et al., 2017). Multiple studies have
shown that fragmentation reduces spreads, with O’Hara & Ye (2011) finding that “more
fragmented stocks have lower transactions costs and faster execution speeds” and that
“fragmentation is associated with higher short-term volatility but greater market
efficiency”. This paradigm study is the primary reference to the theory of the equity market
acting fully cohesive with multiple points of entry despite fragmentation.
Interesting research has also been performed on the role that trading skills play in
fragmentation as a way to measure market quality. Ladley et al. (2015) finds that as the
intricate web of markets and exchanges has grown to include ECN’s and ATS’ that
compete with traditional exchanges, the value of trading skills has increased. This research
was valuable for providing more insight to how a retail investor fits into market
fragmentation. Their findings are summarized well in this quote:

4

“In centralized markets with many traders, transaction prices tend to be
efficient, and small market orders tend to have little price impact. Therefore, the
incentives to acquire skills are weak, and, in equilibrium, most traders are unskilled.
In fragmented markets, market orders have more price impact. Consequently,
skilled traders, who quote prices close to fundamental values, make money by
trading with unskilled traders who do not, and therefore most traders are skilled in
equilibrium. As a result, fragmented markets are more resilient. Inter-market price
variation, defined as the variation in prices between trading venues is, however,
increasing in market fragmentation.” (Ladley et al., 2015)
This study has many findings that are important to this thesis development because this
thesis originated out of curiosity for how fragmentation impacts the retail investor. The
discovery that small orders have a negligible impact on price is fundamental support for
fragmentation’s positive effects since a fragmented market creates so much more liquidity
in the market. Additionally, this research indicates that there could be a rising number of
unskilled retail traders.
An area that is understudied when it comes to market quality is the impact of HFT
on market quality. Foucault & Biais (2014) discuss the lack of evidence but point out the
potential for many negative externalities. Their study investigates policy implications
behind HFT, specifically as it relates to market quality. The IEX may have potentially
introduced one of the purported negative externalities through the access because research
has shown that it may “promote activity detrimental to market quality” (Wah et al., 2017).
This would be a logical conclusion given that access delays work against the positive
features of a fragmented market that is connected by electronic behavior. According to that
research, access delays are a dangerous venue type in a world of make-take fees, execution
instability and improbability, and long queues.
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Lit and Dark Liquidity
A crucial aspect of market fragmentation is the growth of dark trading. Prevalence
of ATSs and ECNs grows virtually every year and has a dramatic impact on the market.
Conceptually, dark pools create a safe haven for block trades to occur without damaging
price discovery for the rest of the market. However, over the past decade the average trade
size in ATSs venues has decreased considerably (Biedermann, 2015; Kwan et al., 2015).
In addition to this, dark pools have been the source of some illegal activity7. Despite this,
dark pools have a distinct competitive advantage in the form of the Increment Rule, the
part of Reg NMS that has allowed for fragmentation to truly take off (Kwan et al., 2015).
A concern with dark pools has been the impact it has on order flow and liquidity.
Gresse (2017) indicates that dark trading and increased fragmentation does not have an
impact on liquidity. In that study it was also shown that lit fragmentation harms the depth
of smaller stocks and that HFTs affect the depth of large stocks. With such a large range
of venue choices, routing choices are difficult to quantify.
One effect that dark pools have had is queue manipulation. There is evidence from
multiple studies that “dark pools allow some traders to bypass existing limit order queues
with minimal price improvement” (Kwan et al., 2015). In fact, ‘queue jumping’ is one of
the main facilitators of the practice of frontrunning by HFT. This is the practice that the
IEX was designed to fight against. Not only is frontrunning a predatory side effect of dark
pools, they also undermine the value that is provided by queue positions for large tick-size
stocks (Moallemi & Yuan, 2017). There have also been benefits to these trends, however.
The trend of ‘queue jumping’ has been a source of increased competition between market

7

https://www.tradersmagazine.com/flashback/flash-friday-turning-the-spotlight-on-dark-pools/
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makers across venues and this is seen as a considerable benefit to fragmentation(Aitken et
al., 2017).
Impacts of Fragmentation
The expansion of venues, participants, and entrants within the equity market system
has created room for more frequent and delicate interactions in response to the many
exogenous forces at play. There have been concerns voiced by academia that certain
conditions of fragmentation could be leading markets to be more fractured than fragmented
(O’Hara & Ye, 2011). This claim can be understood better through the hypothesis that there
is “a tradeoff in market structure between order flow consolidation and competition among
market centers” (Bennett & Wei, 2006). Ultimately, as in any evolutionary process, time
is a huge factor. This is exactly why “the ability to circumvent time priority of displayed
limit orders is one cause of the rapid rise in US equity market fragmentation” (Kwan et al.,
2015). Digital technology has created time-minimizing processes that have sped up
fragmentation unthinkable ways.
With so many changes happening so fast, it is quite logical why such claims have
been made. A non-intuitive indicator of fragmentation is volume vs. liquidity because
volume increases with more interactions in the market, but liquidity is more abstract and
difficult to quantify. This concept is replicated in the information asymmetry between the
stakeholders in the stock market. A more fragmented market leads to higher potential for
information asymmetry which is facilitated by an increased number of interactions (Adrian,
2016). The number of interactions within every aspect of the market system have increased
synchronously with the size of the system itself. This has occurred not just transactionally
in the market, but also throughout the processes that lead to market transactions.

7

Regardless of these abstract trends of evolution in the market system, the general
effect of fragmentation has been discovered to be a positive one. Fragmentation has been
shown to improve market quality, even as fragmentation has increased (Aitken et al., 2017).
Not only that, but fragmented markets have been seen to be more resilient than consolidated
markets (Ladley et al., 2015). One of the most reputable and cited studies on fragmentation
summarizes more of the effects in their paper’s abstract:
““We find that fragmentation affects all stocks; more fragmented stocks
have lower transactions costs and faster execution speeds; and fragmentation is
associated with higher short-term volatility but greater market efficiency, in that
prices are closer to being a random walk. Our results that fragmentation does not
appear to harm market quality are consistent with US markets being a single virtual
market with multiple points of entry”(O’Hara & Ye, 2011)
The hypothesis that the fragmented market has adopted the form of a single, cohesive
market with multiple entry points has become a focus of this research. Under this
hypothesis, the role of the IEX could be explained as a new form of entry for a select type
or number of participants. Ultimately, O’Hara & Ye describe a more important detail about
fragmentation that transcend the state of the market. That detail is that fragmentation has a
large range of explicit and implicit costs.
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CHAPTER II

HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING

Introduction
High-frequency trading has become a controversial buzzword in the finance
industry in the past several years. One of many testimonies for this is the emergence of the
IEX and its corresponding novel, Flash Boys by Michael Lewis. To understand highfrequency trading better, and to use it to under the IEX the market system, it needs to be
well-defined.
Computers have facilitated trading in numerous ways. Generally speaking, the use
of computers to trade is referred to as ‘algorithmic trading’. AT encompasses a wide variety
of subcategories and has increased dramatically since its inception (Hendershott et al.,
2011). One of the subcategories of AT is high-frequency trading. This is an important
differentiation because HFT is uniquely based on speed and can often be predatory or
distasteful.
The founder of the IEX, Brad Katsuyama was particularly curious when he
discovered the effects that HFT had on him as a trader on Wall Street. These effects of
HFT led him to start the IEX and revolutionize the stock market industry. The IEX has
largely been seen as a “band-aid fix” to HFT(Adrian, 2016), but still indicates that more
regulation is necessary in the realm AT and HFT. According to St. John (2016), the entry
of the IEX had less to do with the value proposition of the IEX and more to do with
repairing the negative perception that had been created by HFT.

9

The Rise of Algorithmic Trading
The history of AT can be traced in theory all the way back to 1851 when Paul Julius
Reuter used a cable beneath the English Channel to share stock market quotations. Since
then, AT has continued to evolve and has increased its pace of growth since the onset of
the digital revolution8. In the early 2000’s AT had grown rapidly. By 2009 it was believed
that nearly 73% of volume in the U.S. equity market occurred using AT (Hendershott et
al., 2011). We now live in a world where our market is defined by, and reliant on the
presence of ATs to act as market makers and bridge the gaps created by our fragmented
market system.
When a fund manager searches for a broker-dealer to execute a trade or when a
retail investor works with a financial institution to update their portfolio those interactions
lead to the use of ATs. Prior to AT, these interactions would have led to a broker-dealer
work the floor of the NYSE to execute the trade at the fairest prices. At codified that
process. In fact, AT has come so far along that the NYSE was able to operate with an empty
trading floor during the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic9. Not only have ATs
improved flexibility for investors, the have lowered transaction costs and increased volume
across the board (Menkveld, 2016).
High-Frequency Infrastructure
As previously noted, speed is a crucial differentiator for an AT to be considered
HFT. The phenomenon underlying the need for speed in HFT is an arm’s race for faster
connections to exchange matching centers. In Flash Boys, Katsuyama learned of this early

8

See Appendix B for a concise and interesting history on AT since 1851.
See this article from the NY Post about the COVID-19 shut-down at NYSE:
https://nypost.com/2020/03/18/nyse-to-shut-down-trading-floor-monday-due-to-coronavirus/
9
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on and it helped lead him to IEX co-founder, Ronan Ryan. The novel even begins with a
primer on the HFT Arm’s Race in the form of the Spread Networks dark fiber line Budish
et. al (2015) finds that this is evidence of a flawed market design because the mechanical
capabilities of a continuous limit order book break down at high-frequency time scales.
The mechanical flaw in market design as it relates to HFT occurs primarily because
of the Order Protection Rule, which is part of the Reg NMS implemented by the SEC. The
order protection rules requires that exchanges must route orders to other exchanges if those
exchanges have better prices. Wang (2018) succinctly describes the impact that the HFT
Arm’s Race has on the market system and investors:
“Faster exchanges attract more price-improving limit orders because the
probability of being bypassed by trades with inferior prices on other exchanges is
reduced. When all exchanges speed up, this probability can increase, potentially
harming the welfare of investors. In contrast, increasing connection speeds between
exchanges raises investor welfare by reducing this probability. Nevertheless, no
exchange wants to improve connection speeds because this will reduce its trading
volume
Similarly, Budish et. al (2015) provided a theoretical alternative in the form of batch
auction matching in response to the issue of the mechanical infrastructure in market design.
In their research, they compared time-series data using minutes as a standard versus 250
milliseconds to highlight the clear mechanical arbitrage available to the fastest HFT actors.
They found that “arbitrage opportunities decline dramatically, from a median of 97
milliseconds in 2005 to a median of 7 milliseconds in 2011”.
Front-Running
Prior references to ‘mechanical arbitrage’ are a reference to the practice of ‘frontrunning’ that is used by HFT firms for profits. Due to the implementation of Reg NMS,
there is an unavoidable latency issue due to the travel times of trade signals. Although these
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latency times are typically faster than the blink of an eye—under 20 millionths of a
second—it is still slow enough for very fast computers running HFT algorithms to shave
pennies off millions of trades per day. Front running can be further defined as “using the
knowledge of a large impending trade to take a favorable position in the market before that
trade is executed.” (Adrian, 2016).
Front running is what occurred behind the scenes of Katsuyama’s trading desk that
led him to create the IEX. The IEX has become a market response to the problem of HFT
and front-running. Although this has been seemingly effective, a market-based solution to
a regulated environment is certainly less than ideal. According to Menkveld (2016),
“electronic markets without HFTs could [perhaps] produce an even better service at a lower
cost.” Unfortunately, it has become natural for the growth of fragmentation to happen in
step with the growth of inefficiencies despite any associated benefits.
The SEC offers data visualization tools on a variety of market metrics. One of those
metrics is the trade-to-order volume ratios on given dates. This metric indicates the number
how many trades are actually executed versus placed. Intuitively, the number of trades is
less than the number of orders. However, only roughly 70% of orders are executed
compared to the number of orders canceled. Figure 1 shows
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Figure 1 - Trade-to-Order Ratios in the U.S. (SEC)

A Discrete Issue with HFT
A blog post10 by Economist David Glasner dives into one of the most interesting
viewpoints about ‘the real problem’ with HFT: social waste and the economics of
information. There are understandable truths behind the laments of Michael Lewis in his
book about the IEX. HFT has been shown to lower costs, to lower bid-ask spreads, and add
liquidity to the market. However, Glasner argues that it misses the point about HFT’s
shortcomings using classic economics articles. He first explains a book by Thorstein
Veblen called The Theory of the Leisure Class which highlights the social waste that
engineers create by using their skills to contribute to the luxury of the leisure class without
adding true value to society (Veblen, 1994). Then, he brings up a paper by Jack Hirshleifer
that discusses the economics of information (Hirshleifer, 1978).
What does the leisure class and the economics of information have to do with HFT?
The answer is humbling. The essential theory is that the world’s best and brightest minds
are being used to shave millionths of second off trades using computer algorithms instead

10

Read the opinion by Glasner here: https://uneasymoney.com/2014/04/08/the-real-problem-with-highfrequency-trading/
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of being used to solve issues for society. HFT is the source of massive social waste and
significant market efficiency. For example, Jurich et al. (2020) uncovered that ATs are
more likely to cancel their orders in normal market conditions. The behavioral conditions
from their study support the theory that ATs create inefficiencies in society for the benefit
of those who create and own the algorithms.
Impact of AT & HFT
The truth about AT and HFT is that they have forever changed our market system.
Algorithms provide a trading avenue that reaches volumes that would be impossible using
archaic methods. HFT is estimated to be “responsible for around seventy percent of all
equity trading volume on U.S. markets, HFT algorithms must be precision programmed to
capture enormous amounts of data and to rapidly extract meaning from this input” (Yadav,
2014). Speed is hugely important and was directly related to the co-location of servers. The
rest stakeholders in the market are subject to this either directly or indirectly.
Case Study: The 2015-2016 Stock Market Selloff
The flash crash of 2010 is often the most talked about event in the lifetime of HFT
and AT. A highly interesting discovery that I made about the impact of HFT was the 20152016 stock market sell-off in the U.S. due to turbulence in the Chinese economy. During
that time, the cancel-trade ratio spiked to an unprecedented level on the NSX and the CHX
Exchanges. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show two different views of this data where it shows the
dramatic cancel-to-trade ratio of over 400 cancels per single trade made.
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Figure 2 - U.S. Exchange Cancel-to-Trade Ratio View 1 (SEC)

Figure 3 - U.S. Exchange Cancel-to-Trade Ratio View 2 (SEC)

This event is believed to be initiated by a Chinese policy where state owned banks
were required to give a lot of loans to state-owned companies “even at the expense of riskadjusted profitability”11. State owned banks ended up with a lot of bad loans on their books.

11

https://www.wsj.com/video/what-led-to-china-stock-selloff/E787213B-A6FB-4626-AE6CD8D6757C9B1D.html
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This derived from a $600 billion stimulus bailout in 2008 that led to more state bank
lending. Money supply grew like crazy, led to asset bubbles in market around the world.
In the U.S. it was first a real estate bubble, then stock prices inflated. This also happened
in the Shanghai exchange where the stock market jumped 150% in one year.
The interesting thing about this event is that the spike in U.S. cancel-to-trade
occurred only on two exchanges in the U.S. markets while the rest of the markets remained
largely unaffected in this statistic. Where it really gets interesting is the discovery that these
two exchanges are two of the primary exchanges that have connection to the dark-fiber line
laid by Spread Networks. Additionally, the CHX Exchange had been purchased by a
number of high-profile Chinese investors12 Although it is still only speculation, the two
exchanges have undisputable connections to the realm of AT. These connections create
logical skepticism about how the algorithms interacted with each other in light of the
exogenous events in China.

12

More info. Can be found here: https://money.cnn.com/2016/02/05/investing/china-buys-chicago-stockexchange/index.html
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CHAPTER III

EMERGENCE, MISSION, AND FUNCTION OF THE IEX

Emergence of the IEX
According to Flash Boys, the Investors Exchange arose out of Brad Katsuyama’s
serendipitous side-project of discovering why his trading screens were less predictable than
they once were. Katsuyama’s ventures took him into meetings with a large number of major
players on Wall Street. Along the way, he was introduced to key figures that contributed
to the exchange’s emergence such as Ronan Ryan and Rob Park. Michael Lewis’ novel is
the primary existing account of the early development of the IEX, but it only tells one
version of the story.
It has become commonplace to associate the IEX with HFT’s in both the literature
and in financial world. This connection is due largely to the effect of Flash Boys on the
image of HFT. Regardless of Flash Boys, the motives behind creating the IEX were spurred
along by the prevalence and impact of HFT’s and algorithmic trading (Wah et al., 2017;
Woodward, 2018). Research has extended beyond this to show that there are causal effects
between speed and competition for market share among exchanges (Wang, 2018).
Exchange Function Innovation: The “Speed” Bump
Securities markets differentiate themselves based on their chosen set of trading
variables. Liquidity provisions, fee structures, and auxiliary features of exchanges are
decided upon and adjusted to maximize attraction to buyers and sellers. Every party in the
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market system is in search of a competitive advantage. Those not actively searching for a
new advantage at least stand to gain from finding one.
Regardless of motive from Katsuyama or others, the IEX ‘Speed Bump’ was
created in direction reaction to an “increasing prevalence of HFT” (Woodward, 2018). To
address these concerns, the exchange did two primary things: created a fee structure that
does not use rebates to attract liquidity13, and created proprietary trade function in the form
of the Discretionary Limit (D-Limit) Peg Order Type 14. The IEX has taken a revolutionary
stance in the market by not using rebates. Katsuyama stands by this choice because he
believes it is a core part of their model not to use rebates to attract liquidity15.
The D-Limit order type is a non-displayed order that rests on the IEX and waits for
orders to be routed to their exchange. It is the primary proprietary technology that relies on
the IEX access delay. Simply put, the D-Limit order uses its own algorithm that is modelled
to combat HFT frontrunning. Bishop (2017), an employee of the IEX, explains the
approach in an intuitive way: “Our approach instead is to shape the solution to match the
problem: we can fight math with math! If others are leveraging short term prediction
models to anticipate NBBO changes, than we can build such a model our-selves and deploy
it to protect resting orders.”
There is a notion about the IEX that instead of emerging from a crusade for a
progressive competitive advantage in the secondary market system, the goodwill of an
exclusive group of righteous martyrs took the initiative to fix the HFT problem. It is
seeming to be more than a coincidence that the speed bump could be a competitive

13

See Appendices D and E to view the fee schedule for the IEX
See Appendix F for more information on the D-Limit Order Type from the IEX
15
More about Katsuyama’s position can be read here: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/iex-ceokatsuyama-stands-firm-on-exchanges-fee-only-model-2016-06-21
14
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advantage for exchanges, but research has yet to make concrete conclusions. Witness to
this is the rise of IEX doppelgangers such as NYSE American, the Chicago Stock Exchange
LEAD program, the Nasdaq Extended Life order designation, or the IntelligentCross dark
pool16.
There is great optimism in the belief that allowing the IEX’s new model to exist in
the secondary market system was an unintended benefit from the exchange’s true ambition.
With over 100% growth in their market share between 2016 and 202017, the lingering
question is whether this nascent exchange created a true and effective innovation for
investors or a bubble of belief that their venue provides the fairest experience.
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/steven-cohen-targets-high-frequency-trading-with-dark-pool-venture1523994344
17
https://iextrading.com/ at the bottom of page
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CHAPTER IV

HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis Development
Originally this project began due to a high interest in the world of ‘Finance Twitter’
and the behavior of retail investors that use Twitter to network and learn from other traders.
Along the way it was clear that the retail investor is only on the surface of the securities
markets. Trends in equity market microstructure such as dark pools, payment for order
flow, algorithmic trading and HFT, and fee structures uncovered where there is a deeper
need for research. It was at this point that my advisor shared Flash Boys with me. This
novel by Michael Lewis inspired discussions about the IEX, predatory behavior in HFT,
the physical infrastructure of the markets, and many others. These discussions were a
dynamic part of the financial world, and also a dynamic part of the hypotheses in this thesis.
A driving force behind this project has been the ethical discussion created by Flash
Boys. How much HFT behavior is predatory? What is the relationship that has emerged
between HFT’s and opposing venues? How does this impact theories that HFT companies
are marker makers? These discussions are subsidiary view of the entire fragmented system
but they each explain more about how and where the IEX fits in. The trends of market
microstructure that have been previously discussed are further dimensions of the story of
the IEX and fragmentation. The hypothesis’ in this section developed from various
literature involving the IEX and venues with access delays. These are the testable
predictions intended to assist in providing a substantive contribution to the literature.
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Effectiveness and Integrity of the IEX
Since its inception, the IEX has attempted to differentiate itself by creating and
marketing a high level of fairness and integrity. On their website they claim that “IEX sets
new standards by raising the bar for performance, fairness, and transparency.”18 This
standard they have set for themselves as an exchange is meant to go hand in hand with their
access delay model. According to the IEX, the speed bump was created to “protect
investors from potentially harmful trading that may involve the front-running of orders”
(Pisani, 2016). This claim was genuine enough in the eyes of the SEC to permit the speed
bump model to exist five years ago19.
Since then, how has the speed bump faired against HFT? Chow et. al (2020) showed
that the IEX provides a low realized half-spread and thus a low cost to investors indicating
that the IEX has had success in their mission. Hu’s (2019) findings showed that stocks that
have spent a long-time trading on the IEX have higher decreases in trading costs than other
stocks. This research indicated that the amount of frontrunning was reduced, supporting
the IEX’s goal of deterring HFT’s as well. Besides these, there is little other research that
supports or denies the theory.
Hypothesis 1 – The IEX has been successful in deterring HFT behavior on their exchange
Academic research on access delay exchanges is somewhat uncomprehensive given
the novelty of the exchange design. The entry of the IEX allowed for research on market
quality by examining various metrics such as price efficiency and transaction costs
(Aldrich & Friedman, 2017; Chow et al., 2020; Hu, 2019; Wah et al., 2017). This research

18
19

https://iextrading.com/about/
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2016/34-78102.pdf
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has contributing to answering this hypothesis. To contribute further to the literature, the
following sub-hypotheses are testable inquiries that have guided the empirical analysis of
this work. Hypothesis 1 focuses on analyzing the interaction between HFT with the theory
behind the IEX access delay model. Beyond this, there are also implications for the impacts
seen by a retail investor on IEX. This hypothesis is similar to that of Chow et. al (2020)
who used the entry of the IEX as an event to analyze market quality metrics.
Access Delay Benchmarking
In order for the IEX to enter as an exchange, the SEC adopted a new interpretation
of the Order Protection Rule as part of Reg NMS. This interpretation was the basis for
allowing venues to implement access delays. Access delays create intentional latency on
orders and executions so that the exchange can improve its control over the transactions.
Hypothesis 2 – Of exchanges with speed bumps, the IEX has captured more market share
than other exchanges
Now that many venues have adopted the model, who has had success? I posit that
the IEX has captured the most market share for two reasons. First, they were the first
exchange with an access delay, so they have had a head start on competitors. Second, the
IEX has specifically adopted and marketed themselves as being the most transparent and
fair exchange available to investors.
Ethical Exchange Design
Uncovering the role of the IEX in the market system is a task that prompts for more
information about the integrity of their exchange. The emergence of the IEX was a highly
poignant event in the history of financial markets. In fact, the SEC received over 500
comment letters in a 10-month period during the approval process (Wah et al., 2017). By
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comparison, the entry of BATS and EDGX resulted in only four total comment letters
during their approval processes (Hu, 2019). The IEX sparked a tense discussion among
community members and Flash Boys amplified the emotion behind the situation. This
emotion was certainly tied to the financial implications behind the new exchange model.
However, given the substantial and emotional response it would make sense that the IEX
discussion went even deeper and probed the moral viewpoints of community members.
The profound response to the IEX and the changes to Reg NMS that permitted access
delays have inspired the penultimate hypothesis for this work.
Hypothesis 3 – There is a desire and/or incentive for investors to use a more “ethical”
exchange design than an “unethical” exchange design
It can be cleared seen from Flash Boys that there is a desire for a higher standard
of ethics in the securities market. A more poignant view is that there is a desire to minimize
unfair behavior. With the IEX mission being to create this type of investing environment
it brings up the question of choice for investors. Does the access delay truly limit
frontrunning and the informational inequality described by Adrian (2016). How does the
effect of the access delay create incentives for consumers? Under the assumption that
rational shareholders aim to maximize their return, a primary measure for this will be the
degree that the IEX reduces slippage on trades (Bishop, 2017).
Hypothesis 3a – The IEX has generally been more successful than NYSE American as an
exchange.
Although the NYSE American also has an access delay, the IEX is still the initial
proprietor of the access delay. Additionally, the IEX started with a distinct vision and
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mission for their exchange. NYSE American was largely a market response to the traction
the IEX built up in the industry, and to the opportunity created by the SEC’s approval for
access delays to exist. Ultimately, this can be tested softly by seeing which exchange grew
faster in its early years, and which exchange is more effective in deterring HFT.
Additionally, exchange volume and market share growth over time is a reasonable
indicator.
In Flash Boys an adversarial narrative was created around the IEX and BATS. This
narrative, widely controversial in the financial community, paints IEX as the hero and
BATS as a villain. One of the striking historical events in this process is a fight that
occurred between IEX founder, Brad Katsuyama, and BATS Global Markets’ President,
William O’Brien, live on CNBC20. The debate ensued on the CNBC set that is located on
the trading floor of the NYSE. It is reported that the event completely halted trading on the
NYSE trading floor as traders turned to listen in, and that ‘Finance Twitter’ slowed
significantly as well21. Now that much of the drama has passed, analyzing the success of
the IEX and NYSE American against BATS can offer insight to the discussion and where
it led.
Critics of BATS claim that the exchange was founded with key support from firms
participating in HFT behavior. After its inception, BATS purportedly structured their fee
schedule and business plan in a way to siphon liquidity from the NYSE and NASDAQ to
allow HFT firms to capitalize on the trades being made there. With the beliefs that the IEX
has maintained the integrity that they have claimed to operate with and that investors desire
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Access to this argument can be viewed here: https://www.cnbc.com/video/2014/04/01/the-great-debatecombating-hfts-image.html
21
https://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/01/katsuyama-vs-obrien--who-won-the-fight.html
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ethical markets, it would be logical that the IEX has had more success during its early
lifespan than BATS. These two sub-hypotheses were developed to help assess how each
exchange’s early success impacted the ethical narrative that Flash Boys and the IEX
initiated around the presence of HFT.
Hypothesis 4 – The IEX has increased in their ability to capture liquidity by using their
proprietary IEX signal under the protection of a discretionary peg order
This hypothesis was incepted early in the research process but evolved later once
its testability was discovered. The competitive advantage of the IEX revolves around their
access delay. However, if a venue is trying to acquire more liquidity, why would it create
intentional latency that limits the volume potential of their exchange? The answer lies in
what happens during the 350-millisecond access delay used by the IEX, and that answer is
the discretionary peg (D-Peg) order type. The D-Peg order on the IEX is a non-displayed,
resting order that uses proprietary technology to prevent “slippage”22 on trade executions.
Their technology serves as an active price-updating tool that utilizes the time provided by
their access delay to identify “crumbling quotes”, quotes that indicate slippage on trades,
and re-price the trade at the NBBO before the order executes at an unfavorable price. Since
the IEX has invested significant resources into branding and marketing their transparent
operations, they have provided educational resources that make it easier to conceptualize
their value propositions to traders23.

22

Slippage refers to small loses on trades during their execution. HFT algorithms send odd-lot-sized trades
to search for resting orders. During this first wave process, HFT algorithms progressively send larger orders
to exchanges that have resting liquidity but do so at less favorable prices each time.
23
Visit the IEX website for more insight: https://iextrading.com/behind-the-trade/
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CHAPTER V

METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

Introduction
The approach for this empirical analysis was chosen in attempt to answer the
primary research question: how does the IEX play a role in market fragmentation? To
properly address how the IEX fits into market fragmentation, it was essential to focus on
the IEX relative to other exchanges. There were three focus exchanges in the study in
addition to the IEX. NYSE American is the main comparison exchange to the IEX because
it also has an access delay. The NYSE physical location is the iconic ‘big board’ and this
exchange was used alongside the NASDAQ Book as a proxy for the displayed market.
Focusing on these exchanges created a manageable scope for the analysis without
sacrificing explanatory power. Conclusions on HFT behavior and the impact of access
delays are also provided by this analysis since the data is divided into odd-lots and nonodd-lots, a proxy for HFT.
Part of addressing the primary research question is analyzing market fragmentation.
Explaining fragmentation is a complex task because it draws from an intricate blend of
events and phenomena, past and present. Understanding the role of the IEX within
fragmentation is a challenge due to the how abstract a concept fragmentation is. The
empirical approach for this analysis was created to contribute to the literature surrounding
the IEX but also offers insight to market fragmentation.
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Statistical methods used include first-difference t-tests and ordinary least squares
regressions. These two methods were useful for the analysis because they allowed for
numerous tests using the full selection of sample data. Market share and volume along with
the odd-lots proxy offer a large amount of insight. There is even more insight for the IEX
from combining market share and volume along with the IEX monthly and daily statistics.
Additionally, there is further insight from the CBOE data because it was separated into
Tape A, Tape B, and Tape C share types.
Sample Selection
Sample Period
The empirical analysis uses a sample period from August 13th, 2018 through August
13th, 2020. This sample period originated from dataset that was initially collected for a
working paper that focuses on exchange fees (Jurich, 2021). The sample begins in the
middle of the month to account for changes in fee structures. Changes in fee structures do
not directly impact this analysis. This data was the basis for my sample selection to
facilitate collaboration efforts with my advisor. Additionally, it was a recent time period
that allowed for a relevant analysis of the IEX. There is no other association between the
two research projects and their use of this sample period.
Data Selection
Numerous data points were chosen to address the IEX and market fragmentation.
Data was chosen first for the entire market for use in analyzing market fragmentation
during the sample period. Data from the IEX was then chosen in order to perform a focused
analysis of the IEX during the sample period.
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Market Share and Volume. The initial data selection included volume and market
share for 13 exchanges and three TRFs. This data included volume and market share for
Tape A, Tape B, and Tape C share types as well as for the total market. These data points
were collected twice. First, they were collected with odd-lots included. Next, they were
collected without including odd-lot shares. Odd-lots refers to trades made in a size of 100
shares or less.
IEX Daily and Monthly Statistics. After choosing data for the entire market,
various data was gathered for the IEX in order to expand the sample. Various metrics were
gathered on either a daily or monthly basis depending on what was available. Monthly
metrics included: average routed volume, average matched volume, average market share,
average order size, average aggregate fill size, the percentage of aggregate fills by trade
size for nine different trade sizes24, the number of block trades for three different block
trade sizes25, unique symbols traded, average daily symbols traded, the percentage of trades
made in block sizes, the number of broker members, the percent of broker self-cross26, first
wave rate27, and first wave fill rate28. Daily metrics include total shares handled, routed
volume, matched volume, lit volume, and market share. For further information on these
data points visit the IEX website29. Kwan, Masulis, and McInish (2015) used information
about dark pools to discuss block trades which has inspired the use of block trade
percentage.
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Trade sizes: Under 100 shares, 100-199 shares, 200-299 shares, 300-399 shares, 400-499 shares, 500-999
shares, 1,000-4,999 shares, 5,000-9,999 shares, over 10,000 shares.
25
Block trade sizes: 10,000-19,999 shares, 20,000-49,999 shares, 50,000 shares.
26
These are trades internalized by a broker member and then reported to the exchange.
27
First wave trade fill weight is the percentage of routed trades in the total market that are routed to a given
exchange on the trade’s first routed signal.
28
The first wave fill percentage is the number of shares that are filled out of either the order size or the
number of quoted shares at the target venue depending on the smaller of the two denominator options.
29
https://iextrading.com/stats/
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Data Collection
Data Sources
The core dataset for this analysis was compiled using two sources: CBOE Global
Markets and the IEX. CBOE Global Markets and IEX both offers a variety of public data
through their websites. The IEX also has data that is accessible through their API. Market
share and volume statistics for Tape A, Tape B, Tape C, and the total market were collected
from CBOE Global Market’s website. All IEX daily and monthly stats were collected from
either the IEX website or through the IEX API using Python.
Data Tools
Data collection, storage, preparation, and analysis were performed using three
primary tools: Python, IBM SPSS, and Microsoft Excel. Python was utilized for data
collection through web scraping and IEX API calls. The coding language was also used to
manipulate CSV files into a usable format for Excel or SPSS. Excel was used to store and
prepare data that was collected through Python, CSV downloads, or copy and pasting. IBM
SPSS was used to store prepared data and is the statistical package that was used for all
data analysis.
Data Collection Methods
CBOE Global Markets Data30. Market share and volume data collected from
CBOE Global Market was performed using CSV file downloads for each trading day in
the sample period. These files were downloaded once with odd-lots and again without oddlots.
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Collected from CBOE Global Markets at https://www.cboe.com/us/equities/market_share/market/
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IEX Daily and Monthly Data31. Statistics for the IEX were collected using Python
web scraping, through calls to the IEX API, and through copy and pasting from the IEX
website32. Web scraping was used to collect the first wave weight and first wave fill data
points from the IEX website. This method was used due to a bug encountered while trying
to access the data through the IEX API. Historical monthly statistics for the IEX were
collected using calls to the IEX API. Finally, daily statistics for the IEX were collected
using a simple copy and paste into Excel. Daily statistic access on the IEX API was in a
beta phase during data collection so copy and paste was the simplest solution.
Methodology
The empirical portion of this study was a quantitative analysis of the previously
described data. To analyze the data in the sample I first reported descriptive statistics for
each category of selected data. For my inferential analysis I utilized two statistical methods:
first-difference t-tests and ordinary least squares regression. The basis for each analysis in
this study is that volume and market share data is used with odd-lots and without odd-lots.
Market share and volume data from the CBOE shows a full picture of the
fragmented market, including the IEX. This data also has been divided into Tape A, Tape
B, and Tape C shares to analysis market trends based on listing venue. This data has also
been collected without odd-lots because it serves as a proxy for High-Frequency traders
(O’Hara et al., 2014; Roseman et al., n.d.). Monthly and daily statistics from the IEX allow
for insight into which factors might explain changes in their volume or market share.
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Collected from the IEX. Data can be viewed on their website at https://iextrading.com/stats/
The program written to perform web scraping and API calls was mistakenly overwritten after the data
collection process and are not available for viewing in the appendices.
32
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Creating a scope for the analysis involved focusing on a select number of
exchanges. The analysis uses the NYSE and NASDAQ as constants for the overall market
since they make up such a large amount of total displayed market volume. Additionally,
the NYSE American exchange is used in the analysis as a comparison exchange for the
IEX because it is the other major access delay exchange. Much of the analysis is done
between the IEX and NYSE American. Odd-lots were used for each exchange to
investigate and compare HFT behavior. Monthly and daily statistics were used solely for
the IEX.
Difference tests in this analysis are used in the univariate and ordinary least squares
regression are used in the multivariate. Each dependent variable (either volume or market
share in every model) is used both with and without odd-lots. O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2014)
explain that odd lots are increasingly used in algorithmic and high frequency trading.
Similarly, Johnson, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2017) analyze odd-lot transactions by order
submission type. Menkveld (2013) shows that HFT activity is higher on volatile, highgrowth stocks relative to large, blue chip stocks by using odd-lot data.
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CHAPTER VI

DATA ANALYSIS

Data Preparation
Assembly of the master dataset for this analysis was a long and somewhat
unconventional process. The data was prepared as it was collected and was done so in
sequential order. First, the market share and volume data from the CBOE was collected
followed by the monthly IEX data and then the daily IEX data. After data collection, the
data was prepared in Excel and then exported to SPSS. Within SPSS the data was used to
compute new variables and code binary dummy variables for use in the statistical analysis.
Preparing the market share and volume data from CBOE Global Markets involved
downloading CSV files, writing and running Python code to combine and organize the data
within those files, cross-checking the output in Excel, and then exporting the data to SPSS.
Each CSV file from the CBOE represented one day of trading in the market. These files
could only be downloaded containing odd-lots or omitting odd lots so two CSV files were
downloaded for each trading day in the sample. These files were placed in separate folders
so that all CSVs for the odd-lots data was in one folder and all non-odd-lots data was in a
different folder. Using the pandas library and glob module in Python, I wrote a program33
that parsed through each folder and combined all of the files into a single data frame. To
divide the data into appropriate categories, I wrote another program34 to separate Tape A,
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See Appendix C
See Appendix C
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Tape B, and Tape C categories from the total market. The final program35 I wrote created
a separate data frame that removed the TRF categories of volume and market share to
display only equity exchanges. After exporting the final data frame to Excel, I manually
checked that the program executed properly by examining the data. Finally, I imported the
data into SPSS for analysis.
Data from the IEX required extensive preparation. Since the data was collected in
both daily and monthly forms and was collected using three separate methods, the
preparation process varied. Most of the data preparation occurred manually to circumvent
the need for a complex program or external assistance. The primary challenge with
preparing the IEX data was matching data with appropriate dates. For the daily IEX
statistics, each data point was manually checked and aligned with its appropriate date. For
the monthly IEX statistics, data points were duplicated across every date within the
corresponding month. It is important to note that all monthly data points in the master
dataset were duplicated and used on a daily basis for the corresponding month. As with the
CBOE data, IEX statistics were prepared in Excel before being imported into SPSS.
Final preparation for the dataset required computing adjusted variables and creating
binary variables. Since the dataset included both volume and market share, volume had to
be adjusted using the natural logarithm of each data point. This occurred for each data point
representing volume. Interaction variables were also computed for use in the multivariate
analyses. Interaction variables were computed by taking the product of two other data
points. Finally, binary dummy variables were coded for each exchange.
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See Appendix C
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The final dataset contained 88 variables using all the collected data. Every variable
contained up to 7935 total observations. There were 20 nominal variables and 68 ordinal
variables. The final dataset is available via the University of Maine Digital Commons36

36

https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/
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Descriptive Statistics
Table I – Volume by Exchange
These tables contain descriptive statistics for volume the four sample exchanges in
the empirical portion of this study: the IEX, NYSE American, NYSE, and NASDAQ. This
data is listed in Panels A-D below with each panel representing a respective exchange.
Volume is measured as the single-counted sum of shares traded on an exchange. Odd-lots
refers to trades made in a size of 100 shares or less and the data is reported with odd lots
and without odd-lots. The sample period spans from August 13th, 2018 to August 13th,
2020. This sample contains observations (N = 7935) across 505 trading days. This sample
selection includes two primary access delay venues (IEX & NYSE American), and the two
largest venues by market share (NYSE & NASDAQ). Each panel in this table displays one
of these four exchanges.
Panel A: IEX Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots

Without Odd Lots

With Odd Lots

IEX Volume

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Tape A

505

123,741,927

38,156,866

37,994,990

354,821,017

Tape B

505

22,731,102

10,168,228

8,476,227

81,420,230

Tape C

505

64,700,435

17,001,450

21,895,529

169,483,798

Market
Total

505

211,173,465

63,525,934

69,347,850

585,149,555

Tape A

505

118,601,154

37,199,743

35,916,277

344,274,411

Tape B

505

22,276,583

10,026,254

8,270,128

80,424,447

Tape C

505

61,541,148

16,352,674

20,845,869

162,638,103

Market
Total

505

202,418,885

61,822,831

65,692,601

566,889,380

Table 1 - IEX Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots
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Panel B: NYSE American Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots
N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Tape A

505

7,728,425

3,903,127

2,117,862

28,095,666

Tape B

505

15,058,628

7,810,282

5,310,685

58,475,358

Tape C

505

3,977,312

1,981,022

1,371,621

12,296,252

Market Total

505

26,764,365

13,111,237

9,551,257

98,867,276

Tape A

505

6,918,151

3,547,325

1,864,050

27,863,926

Tape B

505

14,431,443

7,541,253

5,165,493

56,464,277

Tape C

505

3,548,604

1,768,273

1,216,985

11,196,129

Market Total

505

24,898,198

12,084,741

9,037,634

92,265,155

Without Odd Lots

With Odd Lots

NYSE American
Volume

Table 2 - NYSE American Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots

Panel C: NYSE Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots

Without Odd Lots

With Odd Lots

NYSE Volume

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Tape A

505

607,218,125

179,172,751

202,703,417 1,559,868,639

Tape B

505

46,666,551

19,956,791

13,635,105

174,426,101

Tape C

505

41,951,205

12,510,134

13,112,207

96,991,248

Market
Total

505

695,835,881

206,586,489

229,450,729 1,831,285,988

Tape A

505

549,192,212

167,824,713

143,844,007 1,448,105,623

Tape B

505

55,651,452

58,576,193

13,329,077

674,556,026

Tape C

505

47,026,182

42,044,267

12,042,900

339,418,541

Market
Total

505

651,869,847

190,133,080

212,967,717 1,707,250,303

Table 3 - NYSE Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots

36

Panel D: NASDAQ Volume with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots

Without Odd Lots

With Odd Lots

NASDAQ
Volume

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Tape A

505

500,844,645

165,457,690 127,333,847 1,143,726,077

Tape B

505

217,750,887

102,812,082

Tape C

505

559,627,488

199,213,937 201,357,028 1,294,372,787

Market Total

505

Tape A

505

434,678,771

143,663,456 106,871,418 1,017,658,914

Tape B

505

209,478,750

98,127,876

Tape C

505

486,288,375

174,063,362 172,288,389 1,163,979,193

Market Total

505

58,980,002

Maximum

817,897,193

1,278,223,019 443,281,594 387,670,877 3,118,315,141

56,727,627

787,771,142

1,130,445,896 391,641,515 335,887,434 2,755,338,113
Table 4 - NASDAQ with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots
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Table II – Market Share by Venue
These tables contain descriptive statistics for market share the four sample
exchanges in the empirical portion of this study: the IEX, NYSE American, NYSE, and
NASDAQ. This data is listed in Panels A-D below with each panel representing a
respective exchange. Odd-lots refers to trades made in a size of 100 shares or less and the
data is reported with odd lots and without odd-lots. The sample period spans from August
13th, 2018 to August 13th, 2020. This sample contains observations (N = 7935) across 505
trading days. This sample selection includes two primary access delay venues (IEX &
NYSE American), and the two largest venues by market share (NYSE & NASDAQ). Each
panel in this table displays one of these four exchanges.

Panel A: IEX Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots

Without Odd Lots

With Odd Lots

IEX Market
Share

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Skewness

Tape A

505

3.325%

0.410%

2.132%

4.369%

-0.465

Tape B

505

1.435%

0.210%

0.782%

1.986%

-0.536

Tape C

505

2.664%

0.539%

1.135%

3.914%

-0.922

Market
Total

505

2.728%

0.406%

1.556%

3.616%

-0.878

Tape A

505

3.420%

0.427%

2.178%

4.587%

-0.364

Tape B

505

1.442%

0.209%

0.783%

1.995%

-0.519

Tape C

505

2.741%

0.570%

1.133%

4.141%

-0.849

Market
Total

505

2.786%

0.418%

1.571%

3.762%

-0.829

Table 5 - IEX Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots
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Panel B: NYSE American Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots
N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Skewness

Tape A

505

0.199%

0.045%

0.130%

0.375%

1.548

Tape B

505

0.955%

0.317%

0.323%

2.164%

0.852

Tape C

505

0.152%

0.033%

0.085%

0.269%

0.798

Market Total

505

0.330%

0.074%

0.199%

0.682%

0.969

Tape A

505

0.192%

0.046%

0.123%

0.480%

2.104

Tape B

505

0.940%

0.318%

0.320%

2.147%

0.888

Tape C

505

0.148%

0.041%

0.081%

0.477%

3.058

Market Total

505

0.327%

0.075%

0.198%

0.689%

1.029

Without Odd Lots

With Odd Lots

NYSE American
Market Share

Table 6 - NYSE American Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots

Panel C: NYSE Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots

Without Odd Lots

With Odd Lots

NYSE Market
Share

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Skewness

Tape A

505

16.271%

1.280%

12.455%

23.948%

-0.148

Tape B

505

2.947%

0.568%

1.515%

4.627%

-0.099

Tape C

505

1.684%

0.278%

1.114%

2.577%

0.151

Market
Total

505

8.921%

0.941%

6.042%

13.237%

-0.794

Tape A

505

15.914%

2.451%

4.998%

23.948%

-2.665

Tape B

505

3.466%

2.483%

1.532%

18.483%

4.91

Tape C

505

1.972%

1.276%

1.093%

8.867%

4.108

Market
Total

505

8.922%

0.977%

5.963%

13.539%

-0.729

Table 7 - NYSE Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots
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Panel D: NASDAQ Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots

Without Odd Lots

With Odd Lots

NASDAQ
Market Share

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Skewness

Tape A

505

13.259%

1.219%

9.808%

16.606%

0.14

Tape B

505

13.484%

1.407%

9.852%

18.451%

0.428

Tape C

505

21.960%

1.431%

18.103%

25.990%

-0.041

Market
Total

505

16.069%

0.983%

12.770%

18.761%

0.024

Tape A

505

12.360%

1.182%

8.874%

15.583%

0.076

Tape B

505

13.338%

1.402%

9.675%

18.349%

0.392

Tape C

505

20.604%

1.339%

16.885%

24.377%

-0.068

Market
Total

505

15.149%

0.943%

11.771%

17.872%

-0.082

Table 8 - NASDAQ Market Share with Odd-Lots and Without Odd-Lots
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Table III – IEX Volume
The table here displays descriptive statistics for different sub-categories of volume
on the IEX. Volume is measured by the single-counted sum of shares traded daily on the
IEX. The sample period spans from August 13th, 2018 to August 13th, 2020. This sample
contains observations (N = 505) accounting for all trading days on the IEX during the
sample period.

Volume by Type on IEX
Volume Type

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Total Volume

505

244,900,402

73,885,664

77,453,934

678,665,029

Routed Volume

505

34,061,269

10,655,123

8,106,084

93,515,474

Matched Volume

505

210,839,133

64,348,784

69,347,850

585,149,555

Displayed Volume

505

41,463,696

15,114,474

8,783,027

90,278,928

Table 9 - Volume by Type on IEX

41

Table IV – IEX Trade Size
This table displays descriptive statistics for monthly aggregate trade sizes on the
IEX. Trade size is determined in the sample as being the percentage of filled orders in each
range of share amounts on an aggregate basis. The sample period spans from August 2018
to August 2020. This sample contains observations (N = 505) accounting for all trading
days on the IEX during the sample period.

Percent of Aggregate Fills by Trade Size
Share Size

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Skewness

< 100

505

73.634%

1.419%

70.100%

76.480%

-0.551

100 - 199

505

2.308%

0.470%

1.540%

3.200%

0.315

200 - 299

505

10.744%

0.608%

9.280%

12.930%

1.648

300 - 399

505

4.516%

0.232%

4.060%

4.990%

0.106

400 - 499

505

2.324%

0.168%

1.960%

2.820%

0.318

500 - 999

505

3.974%

0.273%

3.560%

4.510%

0.284

1000 - 4999

505

2.260%

0.199%

1.970%

2.740%

0.777

5000 - 9999

505

0.162%

0.017%

0.140%

0.210%

1.246

10000 <

505

0.083%

0.010%

0.070%

0.110%

0.907

Table 10 - IEX Trade Sizes
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Table V – IEX Block Trade Size
This table displays descriptive statistics for the monthly number of trades made in
block sizes. A block size trade is a very large trade that is measured as being over 10,000
shares. The sample period spans from August 2018 to August 2020. This sample contains
observations (N = 505) accounting for all trading days on the IEX during the sample period.

Number of Trades in Block Sizes
Trade Metric

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum Maximum Skewness

% of Block Trades

505 5.50%

0.58%

4.63%

6.76%

0.828

Block Trades Between
10,000 - 19,999 Shares

505

5,762

2,308

3,873

14,911

2.857

Block Trades Between
20,000 - 49,999 Shares

505

1,652

852

1,094

5,223

3.279

Block Trades Over
50,000 Shares

505

252

127

142

697

2.099

Table 11 - Block Trades on the IEX
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Table VI – IEX Monthly Statistics
The table below reports descriptive statistics for various exchange metrics for the
IEX measured monthly. Each statistic has been measured monthly for the IEX. Average
order size, average aggregate fill size, and the number of unique symbols traded are all
intuitively named for the data they represent. First wave trade fill weight is the percentage
of routed trades in the total market that are routed to a given exchange on the trade’s first
routed signal. The first wave fill percentage is the number of shares that are filled out of
either the order size or the number of quoted shares at the target venue depending on the
smaller of the two denominator options. The sample period spans from August 2018 to
August 2020. This sample contains observations (N = 505) accounting for all trading days
on the IEX during the sample period.

Monthly Trade Statistics on the IEX
Exchange Metrics

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum Maximum Skewness

Average Order Size

505

454.84

102.65

266

674

0.329

Average Aggregate
Fill Size

505

175.65

14.02

140

201

-0.550

Number of Unique
Symbols Traded

505

8122.46

229.47

7818

8600

0.730

First Wave Trade
Fill Weight

505

7.69%

9.23%

0.03%

47.02%

1.534

First Wave Fill
Percentage

505

96.03%

5.18%

55.03%

99.53%

-3.644

Table 12 - Monthly Trading Statistics for the IEX
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Table VII – Exchange Fill Weights and Fill Rates
The tables below report descriptive statistics for the fill weights and fill rates of
each exchange in the US. First wave trade fill weight is the percentage of routed trades in
the total market that are routed to a given exchange on the trade’s first routed signal. The
first wave fill percentage is the number of shares that are filled out of either the order size
or the number of quoted shares at the target venue depending on the smaller of the two
denominator options. Each statistic has been measured monthly for the sample period
which spans from August 2018 to August 2020. This sample contains observations (N =
7935) accounting for 505 trading days during the sample period.
Panel A: Fill Weights for US Venues
Fill Weight by Exchange
Venue

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Skewness

IEX

7935

16.570%

1.961%

12.620%

20.920%

-0.135

NYSE American

7935

0.316%

0.080%

0.210%

0.510%

0.903

NYSE

7935

16.507%

5.533%

9.230%

23.840%

0.080

NASDAQ

7935

29.248%

8.208%

21.020%

47.020%

0.959

NYSE Arca

7935

13.003%

3.328%

7.590%

16.830%

-0.239

EDGX

7935

6.866%

0.947%

4.940%

8.960%

-0.242

BATS (Z)

7935

10.133%

5.188%

4.950%

20.940%

0.832

BATS (Y)

7935

2.631%

1.153%

0.590%

4.930%

-0.174

NYSE National

7935

0.900%

0.711%

0.230%

2.180%

0.720

EDGA

7935

1.773%

0.555%

0.780%

2.920%

0.102

NASDAQ BX

7935

1.105%

0.808%

0.170%

3.130%

0.698

NASDAQ PSX

7935

0.767%

0.161%

0.480%

1.030%

-0.403

NYSE Chicago

7935

0.180%

0.196%

0.030%

0.840%

1.900

Table 13 - Fill Weights for US Venues
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Panel B: Fill Rates for US Venues
Fill Rate by Exchange
Venue

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum Skewness

IEX

7935

98.638%

1.464%

91.980%

99.530%

-4.086

NYSE American

7935

97.994%

0.608%

95.780%

98.960%

-1.684

NYSE

7935

97.506%

1.199%

93.070%

98.640%

-1.961

NASDAQ

7935

98.583%

0.554%

96.750%

99.200%

-1.654

NYSE Arca

7935

97.999%

0.742%

95.200%

98.830%

-2.041

EDGX

7935

99.111%

0.247%

98.170%

99.350%

-2.308

BATS (Z)

7935

98.862%

0.207%

98.190%

99.110%

-1.357

BATS (Y)

7935

98.429%

0.292%

97.680%

99.030%

-0.333

NYSE National

7935

90.122%

3.283%

79.740%

94.210%

-1.478

EDGA

7935

97.015%

1.174%

93.830%

98.200%

-1.306

NASDAQ BX

7935

92.847%

1.297%

89.170%

94.590%

-1.309

NASDAQ PSX

7935

95.503%

1.128%

93.330%

97.340%

-0.342

NYSE Chicago

7935

85.804%

11.483%

55.030%

98.510%

-0.741

Table 14 - Fill Rates for US Venues
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Inferential Statistics
Table VIII – Comparison of HFT Presence on Exchanges by Volume37
These tables report first difference test results between an exchange’s mean volume
with odd-lots versus without odd-lots. Volume is measured as the single-counted sum of
shares traded daily on an exchange. Odd-lots refers to trades made in a size of 100 shares
or less. This data reports values containing and odd-lots and omitting odd-lots as a proxy
for HFT. The difference is calculated by subtracting non-odd-lots values from odd-lots
values. The sample period spans from August 13th, 2018, to August 13th, 2020. This
sample contains observations (N = 7935) across 505 trading days. This sample selection
includes two primary access delay venues (IEX & NYSE American), and the two largest
venues by market share (NYSE & NASDAQ). Each panel in this table displays one of
these four exchanges. Significant levels are represented by *, **, & *** for 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.
Panel A: HFT Presence on the IEX by Volume
IEX Volume
HFT Proxy
With Odd Lots

Without Odd
Lots

Difference

Odd Lots /
Volume

T-Stat

Tape A

123,741,927

118,601,154

5,140,773

4.15%

21.91***

Tape B

22,731,102

22,276,583

454,519

2.00%

16.4***

Tape C

64,700,435

61,541,148

3,159,287

4.88%

12.01***

Market

211,173,465

202,418,885

8,754,580

4.15%

20.65***

IEX

Classification

Table 15 - HFT Presence on the IEX

37

This table is aggregated in Appendix # to facilitate comparison between exchanges
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Panel B: HFT Presence on NYSE American by Volume
NYSE American Volume
HFT Proxy
With Odd Lots

Without Odd
Lots

Difference

Odd Lots
/ Volume

T-Stat

Tape A

7,728,425

6,918,151

810,274

10.48%

3.57***

Tape B

15,058,628

14,431,443

627,185

4.16%

2.44***

Tape C

3,977,312

3,548,604

428,708

10.78%

3.11***

Market

26,764,365

24,898,198

1,866,167

6.97%

5.5***

NYSE American

Classification

Table 16 - HFT Presence on NYSE American

Panel C: HFT Presence on NYSE by Volume
NYSE Volume
HFT Proxy

NYSE

Classification

Difference

Odd Lots
/ Volume

T-Stat

With Odd Lots

Without Odd
Lots

Tape A

607,218,125

549,192,212

58,025,913

9.56%

7.48***

Tape B

55,651,452

46,666,551

8,984,901

19.25%

34.87***

Tape C

47,026,182

41,951,205

5,074,977

12.10%

47.74***

Market

695,835,881

651,869,847

43,966,034

6.32%

7.64***

Table 17 - HFT Presence on NYSE
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Panel D: HFT Presence on NASDAQ by Volume
NASDAQ Volume
HFT Proxy

NASDAQ

Classification

Difference

Odd Lots
/ Volume

T-Stat

With Odd Lots

Without Odd
Lots

Tape A

500,844,645

434,678,771

66,165,874

13.21%

0.85

Tape B

217,750,887

209,478,750

8,272,137

3.80%

7.23***

Tape C

559,627,488

486,288,375

73,339,112

13.10%

2.56***

Market

1,278,223,019

1,130,445,896

147,777,123

11.56%

0.12

Table 18 - HFT Presence on NASDAQ
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Table IX – Comparison of HFT Presence on Exchanges by Market Share38
These tables report first difference test results between an exchange’s mean market
share with odd-lots versus without odd-lots. Market share for an exchange is measured as
the quotient of volume for the exchange divided by total volume in the market. Market
share is measured daily in this sample. Odd-lots refers to trades made in a size of 100 shares
or less. This data reports values containing and odd-lots and omitting odd-lots as a proxy
for HFT. The difference is calculated by subtracting non-odd-lots values from odd-lots
values. A negative difference indicates an increase when accounting for odd-lots. The
sample period spans from August 13th, 2018, to August 13th, 2020. This sample contains
observations (N = 7935) across 505 trading days. This sample selection includes two
primary access delay venues (IEX & NYSE American), and the two largest venues by
market share (NYSE & NASDAQ). Each panel in this table displays one of these four
exchanges. Significant levels are represented by *, **, & *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
Panel A: HFT Presence on the IEX by Market Share
IEX Market Share

IEX

Classification

HFT Proxy

Difference

T-Stat

3.420%

-0.0949%

-4.67***

1.435%

1.442%

-0.0075%

-5.62***

Tape C

2.664%

2.741%

-0.0767%

-12.64***

Market

2.728%

2.786%

-0.0579%

-4.59***

With Odd Lots

Without Odd Lots

Tape A

3.325%

Tape B

Table 19 - HFT Presence on the IEX by Market Share
38

This table is aggregated in Appendix # to facilitate comparison between exchanges
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Panel B: HFT Presence on NYSE American by Market Share
NYSE American Market Share
HFT Proxy

NYSE American

Classification

Difference

T-Stat

0.192%

0.0074%

8.67***

0.955%

0.940%

0.0151%

4.32***

Tape C

0.152%

0.148%

0.0044%

17.02***

Market

0.330%

0.327%

0.0020%

5.45***

With Odd Lots

Without Odd Lots

Tape A

0.199%

Tape B

Table 20 - HFT Presence on NYSE American by Market Share

Panel C: HFT Presence on NYSE by Market Share
NYSE Market Share
HFT Proxy

NYSE

Classification

Difference

T-Stat

15.914%

0.3569%

37.38***

2.947%

3.466%

-0.5194%

-66.12***

Tape C

1.684%

1.972%

-0.2871%

-71.69***

Market

8.921%

8.922%

0.0010%

16.07***

With Odd Lots

Without Odd Lots

Tape A

16.271%

Tape B

Table 21 - HFT Presence on NYSE by Market Share
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Panel D: HFT Presence on NASDAQ by Market Share
NASDAQ Market Share
HFT Proxy

NASDAQ

Classification

Difference

T-Stat

12.360%

0.8991%

7.96***

13.484%

13.338%

0.1459%

4.06***

Tape C

21.960%

20.604%

1.3563%

1.61*

Market

16.069%

15.149%

0.9200%

4.23***

With Odd Lots

Without Odd Lots

Tape A

13.259%

Tape B

Table 22 - HFT Presence on NASDAQ by Market Share
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Table X – Regression by Exchange Volume
This table reports the results of an ordinary least squares regression that uses
exchange volume as the dependent variable. This dependent variable was used in two
forms, one containing odd-lot trades and one omitting odd-lot trades. Volume is measured
as the single-counted sum of shares traded daily on an exchange. Odd-lots refers to trades
made in a size of 100 shares or less. The reason this data reports values containing and oddlots and omitting odd-lots is because it serves as a proxy for HFT. The sample period spans
from August 13th, 2018 to August 13th, 2020. This sample contains observations (N =
7935) across 505 trading days. The test parameters include the two primary access delay
venues (IEX & NYSE American), and the two largest venues by market share (NYSE &
NASDAQ). Beta coefficients for each test parameter are stacked above the corresponding
test statistic.Test statistics include significant levels which are represented by *, **, & ***
for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 = 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝑉 + 𝛽# 𝐴 + 𝛽$ 𝑁 + 𝛽% 𝑄 + 𝜖
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54
504
7920
0.000
0.000

Trading Days
R-Squared
Adj. R-Squared

-3.31

-0.77

0.144

0.144

7920

504

-36.49

-2.337***

-0.212***

-0.053

1157.54

504

0.256

0.257

7920

0.147

0.147

7920

0.257

0.258

7920

Table 23 - Exchange Volume Using Odd-Lots Proxy

0.000

0.000

7920

504

29.29

0.29
504

1.738***

1.79***

20.29

-35.71

-2.119***

0.57

0.034

1143.81

19.057***

T-Stat

β

Model C

19.95

-36.90

-2.334***

-2.87

-0.181***

1167.75

19.272***

T-Stat

β

Model B

1.204***

504

-0.33

-0.023

1108.23

19.113***

T-Stat

β

Model A

Without Odd Lots

1.198***

-35.29

-2.119***

0.11

0.006

1134.80

T-Stat

1100.39

T-Stat

T-Stat

β
19.128***

β

β

Model C

19.187*** 19.346***

Model B

Model A

Observations

NASDAQ (Q)

NYSE (N)

NYSE Am (A)

IEX (V)

Intercept/Constant

Model Specifications

With Odd Lots

Exchange Volume Using Odd-Lots Proxy

Table XI – Regression by Exchange Market Share
This table reports the results of an ordinary least squares regression that uses
exchange market share as the dependent variable. This dependent variable was used in two
forms, one containing odd-lot trades and one omitting odd-lot trades. Market share for an
exchange is measured as the quotient of volume for the exchange divided by total volume
in the market. Market share is measured daily in this sample. Odd-lots refers to trades made
in a size of 100 shares or less. The reason this data reports values containing and odd-lots
and omitting odd-lots is because it serves as a proxy for HFT. The sample period spans
from August 13th, 2018 to August 13th, 2020. This sample contains observations (N =
7935) across 505 trading days. The test parameters include the two primary access delay
venues (IEX & NYSE American), and the two largest venues by market share (NYSE &
NASDAQ). Panel A uses only the four exchanges as test parameters. Panel B contains the
same analysis but includes the first wave trade fill weight as the initial parameter. Panel C
replicates the previous analysis again but adds an interaction variable between first wave
trade fill weight and total market volume (with odd-lots). First wave trade fill weight is the
percentage of routed trades in the total market that are routed to a given exchange on the
trade’s first routed signal Beta coefficients for each test parameter are stacked above the
corresponding test statistic. Test statistics include significant levels which are represented
by *, **, & *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐴:
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
= 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝑉 + 𝛽# 𝐴 + 𝛽$ 𝑁 + 𝛽% 𝑄 + 𝜖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
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56

63.86

0.061***

T-Stat

β

Model C

504
7920
0.014
0.014

Trading Days

R-Squared

Adj. R-Squared

-10.61

-9.96

0.056

0.056

7920

504

-18.76

504
7920
0.052
0.052

7920
0.013
0.013

0.124

0.125

7920

Table 24 - Exchange Market Share Using Odd-Lots Proxy

0.149

0.149

7920

504

29.29

0.30
504

1.738***

0.099***

20.29

-35.71

-2.119***

0.57

0.034***

1143.81

19.057***

T-Stat

β

Model C

8.10

-36.90

-2.334***

-2.87

-0.181***

1167.75

19.272***

T-Stat

β

Model B

1.204***

504

-0.33

-0.023***

1108.23

19.113***

T-Stat

β

Model A

Without Odd Lots

0.028***

-16.95

-0.067*** -0.058***

-12.09

-0.039*** -0.043*** -0.034***

75.49

71.56

T-Stat

T-Stat
0.071***

β

β

0.066***

Model B

Model A

Observations

NASDAQ (Q)

NYSE (N)

NYSE Am (A)

IEX (V)

Intercept /
Constant

Model
Specifications

With Odd Lots

Exchange Market Share Using Odd-Lots Proxy

𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐵:
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
= 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝐹 + 𝛽# 𝑉 + 𝛽$ 𝐴 + 𝛽% 𝑁 + 𝛽% 𝑄 + 𝜖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒

𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐶:

𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒
= 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝐹 + 𝛽# 𝑉 + 𝛽$ 𝐴 + 𝛽% 𝑁 + 𝛽% 𝑄 + 𝛽% (𝐹 ∗ λ&,( ) + 𝜖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒

Panel A: Exchange Market Share Using Odd-Lots Proxy

57

Observations
Trading Days
R-Squared
Adj. R-Squared

NASDAQ (Q)

NYSE (N)

NYSE Am (A)

IEX (V)

First Wave Weight
(F)

504
7920
0.715
0.715

504
7920
0.849
0.849

504
7920
0.857
0.857

504
7920
0.846
0.846

Table 25 - Exchange Market Share Using Odd-Lots Proxy & First Wave Weight

504
7920
0.868
0.868

26.17

31.24
504
7920
0.876
0.876

0.032***

0.038***

504
7920
0.854
0.854

-22.85

-0.017***

-55.84

-0.048***

89.93

0.003***

68.35

15.27

-19.40

-0.015***

-76.56

-0.06***

184.93

0.004***

60.60

0.019***

13.08

504
7920
0.717
0.717

-74.08

-0.06***

188.43

0.004***

55.87

0.017***

0.013***

-23.39

-18.93

128.95

0.004***

38.77

0.014***

Model D
β
T-Stat

0.011***

-0.017***

-57.74

-0.051***

90.45

0.004***

69.67

0.02***

-0.015***

-78.96

-76.53

187.24
-0.064***

190.87

128.36

0.004***

58.92

-0.063***

0.005***

0.004***

54.37

37.01

0.017***

0.015***

0.015***

Intercept/Constant

0.014***

Without Odd-Lots
Model B
Model C
β
β
T-Stat
T-Stat

Exchange Market Share Using Odd-Lots Proxy and First Wave Weight
With Odd-Lots
Model
Model A Model B
Model C
Model D Model A
Specifications
β
β
β
β
β
T-Stat
T-Stat
T-Stat
T-Stat
T-Stat

Panel B: Exchange Market Share Using Odd-Lots Proxy with First Wave Weight
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Observations
Trading Days
R-Squared
Adj. R-Squared

504
7920
0.715
0.715

504
7920
0.876
0.876

0.004***
128.952

0.015***
16.89
-0.062***
-50.318
-0.017***
-22.383
0.011***
12.704
0.047***
33.964

504
7920
0.879
0.879

504
7920
0.854
0.854

504
7920
0.868
0.868

504
7920
0.871
0.871

-12.805

16.693
-0.059***
-48.831
-0.016***
-21.847
0.013***
14.924
0.04***
29.379

0.015***

-12.978

89.929
-0.048***
-55.841
-0.017***
-22.849
0.013***
15.272
0.032***
26.168

0.003***

-0.001***

184.934
-0.06***
-76.556
-0.015***
-19.403

0.004***

Model D
β
T-Stat
0.018***
58.999

-0.001***

504
7920
0.717
0.717

Model A
β
T-Stat
0.014***
38.767

Model D
β
T-Stat
0.018***
60.191

Without Odd Lots
Model B
Model C
β
β
T-Stat
T-Stat
0.017*** 0.019***
60.596
68.349

Table 26 - Exchange Market Share Using Odd-Lots Proxy, Routing Weights, & Interaction Variable

504
7920
0.857
0.857

Exchange Market Share Using Odd-Lots Proxy and
Routing Weights with Interaction Variable
With Odd Lots
Model A
Model B
Model C
Model
Specifications
β
β
β
T-Stat
T-Stat
T-Stat
Intercept/Constant
0.014*** 0.017***
0.02***
37.014
58.916
69.671
First Wave Weight
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(F)
128.36
187.236
90.453
IEX (V)
-0.064*** -0.051***
-78.956
-57.739
NYSE Am (A)
-0.015*** -0.017***
-18.93
-23.389
NYSE (N)
0.011***
13.08
NASDAQ (Q)
0.038***
31.24
First Wave Weight
* Total Volume
WOL (F * λ t, w)

Panel C: Exchange Market Share Using Odd-Lots Proxy, First Wave Weight, and
Interaction Variable

Table XII – Regression by IEX Monthly Statistics Volume
This table reports the results of an ordinary least squares regression that uses
adjusted exchange volume for the IEX as the dependent variable. Volume is measured as
the single-counted sum of shares traded daily on the IEX and has been adjusted using the
natural logarithm of the statistic. This dependent variable was used in two forms, one
containing odd-lot trades and one omitting odd-lot trades. Odd-lots refers to trades made
in a size of 100 shares or less. This data reports values containing and odd-lots and omitting
odd-lots as a proxy for HFT. The reason this data reports values containing and odd-lots
and omitting odd-lots is because it serves as a proxy for HFT. The sample period spans
from August 13th, 2018 to August 13th, 2020. This sample contains observations (N =
7935) across 505 trading days. The test parameters include multiple different market
statistics from the IEX. Panel A uses each metric along with the odd-lot trade percentage.
Panel B contains the same analysis but removes odd-lot trade percentage because the
dependent variable omits odd-lots. Beta coefficients for each test parameter are stacked
above the corresponding test statistic. Test statistics include significant levels which are
represented by *, **, & *** for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐴:

ln(𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒) = 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝑃 + 𝛽# 𝑂 + 𝛽$ 𝑆 + 𝛽% 𝐵 + 𝛽) 𝐹 + 𝜖

𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐵:

ln(𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒) = 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝑂 + 𝛽# 𝑆 + 𝛽$ 𝐵 + 𝛽% 𝐹 + 𝜖
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Panel A: IEX Volume Regression Using Monthly Statistics with Odd-Lots
IEX Volume with Odd-Lots Using IEX Stats
Model Specifications
Intercept/Constant
Odd-Lot Trade % (P)

Model A

Model B

Model C

Model D

Model E

β

β

β

β

β

T-Stat

T-Stat

T-Stat

T-Stat

T-Stat

23.11*** 24.25*** -30.92*** -18.42*** -8.71***
41.73

40.63

-5.18

-2.75

-1.38

-5.4***

-5.25***

-2.5***

-1.68***

1.33***

-7.18

-7.10

-3.36

-2.20

1.70

-0.21***

0.31***

0.11***

-0.32***

-4.60

4.44

1.35

-3.54

5.56***

4.18***

3***

9.28

6.07

4.62

8.63***

16.1***

3.90

7.32

Order Size (O)
Unique Symbols Traded (S)
% Traded in Block (B)
First Wave Weight (F)

0.06***
9.23

Observations

504

504

504

504

504

Trading Days

7920

7920

7920

7920

7920

R-Squared

0.093

0.130

0.258

0.280

0.385

Adj. R-Squared

0.091

0.126

0.253

0.274

0.379
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Panel B: IEX Volume Regression Using Monthly Statistics without Odd-Lots
IEX Volume without Odd-Lots Using IEX Stats
Model Specifications
Intercept/Constant
Order Size (O)

Model A

Model B

Model C

Model D

β

β

β

β

T-Stat

T-Stat

T-Stat

T-Stat

20.39***

-41.07***

-22.05***

-6.51***

70.49

-7.61

-3.35

-1.03

-0.21***

0.39***

0.13***

-0.3**

-4.5

5.72

1.47

-3.29

6.42***

4.42***

2.86***

11.40

6.43

4.34

10.52***

15.23

4.86

7.38

Unique Symbols Traded (S)
% Traded in Blocks (B)
First Wave Weight (F)

0.05***
9.28

Observations

504

504

504

504

Trading Days

7920

7920

7920

7920

R-Squared

0.039

0.236

0.271

0.378

Adj. R-Squared

0.037

0.233

0.267

0.373
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Table XIII – Regression by IEX Monthly Statistics Market Share
This table reports the results of an ordinary least squares regression that uses market
share for the IEX as the dependent variable. Market share for an exchange is measured as
the quotient of volume for the exchange divided by total volume in the market. Market
share is measured daily in this sample. Odd-lots refers to trades made in a size of 100 shares
or less. The reason this data reports values containing and odd-lots and omitting odd-lots
is because it serves as a proxy for HFT. The sample period spans from August 13th, 2018
to August 13th, 2020. This sample contains observations (N = 7935) across 505 trading
days. The test parameters include multiple different market statistics from the IEX. Panel
A uses each metric along with the odd-lot trade percentage. Panel B contains the same
analysis but removes odd-lot trade percentage because the dependent variable omits oddlots. Beta coefficients for each test parameter are stacked above the corresponding test
statistic. Test statistics include significant levels which are represented by *, **, & *** for
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐴:
𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐵:

*+,-./01 345671
84&.5 9.:;1& 345671
*+,-./01 345671
84&.5 9.:;1& 345671

= 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝑃 + 𝛽# 𝑂 + 𝛽$ 𝑆 + 𝛽% 𝐵 + 𝛽) 𝐹 + 𝜖
= 𝛽! + 𝛽" 𝑂 + 𝛽# 𝑆 + 𝛽$ 𝐵 + 𝛽% 𝐹 + 𝜖
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Panel A: IEX Market Share Regression Using Monthly Statistics with Odd-Lots
IEX Market Share with Odd-Lots Using IEX Stats
Model Specifications
Intercept/Constant
Odd-Lot Trade % (P)

Model A

Model B

Model C

Model D

Model E

β

β

β

β

β

T-Stat

T-Stat

T-Stat

T-Stat

T-Stat

0.06***

-0.01***

0.7***

0.44***

0.64***

6.12

-0.78

9.02

5.22

9.35

-0.1***

-0.04***

-0.04*** -0.05*** -0.08***
-3.20

Order Size (O)

-5.16

-8.75

-10.46

-4.77

0.01***

0.01***

0.01***

0***

19.79

5.50

8.31

0.03

-0.07***

-0.04***

-0.07***

-9.14

-4.91

-9.45

-0.18***

-0.03***

-6.29

-1.05

Unique Symbols Traded (S)
% Traded in Block (B)
First Wave Weight (F)

0***
17.16

Observations

504

504

504

504

504

Trading Days

7920

7920

7920

7920

7920

R-Squared

0.02

0.45

0.528

0.563

0.725

Adj. R-Squared

0.018

0.448

0.526

0.56

0.723

Table 27 - IEX Market Share Regression Using Monthly Statistics with Odd-Lots
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Panel B: IEX Volume Regression Using Monthly Statistics without Odd-Lots
IEX Market Share without Odd-Lots Using IEX Stats
Model Specifications
Intercept/Constant
Order Size (O)

Model A

Model B

Model C

Model D

β

β

β

β

T-Stat

T-Stat

T-Stat

T-Stat

-0.04***

0.35***

0.18*

0.59***

-10.8

4.45

1.90

8.16

0.01***

0.01***

0.01***

0

18.18

7.77

7.88

-1.27

-0.04***

-0.02**

-0.06***

-4.99

-2.32

-8.51

-0.09***

0.03

-2.8

1.40

Unique Symbols Traded (S)
% Traded in Blocks (B)
First Wave Weight (F)

0***
21.1

Observations

504

504

504

504

Trading Days

7920

7920

7920

7920

R-Squared

0.397

0.425

0.434

0.702

Adj. R-Squared

0.395

0.423

0.431

0.7

Table 28 - IEX Volume Regression Using Monthly Statistics without Odd-Lots
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CHAPTER VII

RESULTS

Sample Overview
Table 1 Results
All four of the sample exchanges used displayed higher volume when accounting
for odd-lots trades than without odd-lots trades. The IEX had nearly ten times as much
volume as NYSE American. Volume on the NYSE big board is triple that of the IEX and
the volume on the NASDAQ Book is six times the amount of the IEX. The IEX volume
was comprised mostly in Tape A stocks while the NYSE American volume occurred most
in Tape B stocks. The NYSE big board displayed an increase in Tape B and Tape C volume
when accounting for odd-lots and these were the only two cases where volume increased
when removing odd-lots from the sample.
Table 2 Results
Of each sample exchange, the IEX was the only exchange that displayed a
considerable increase in market share when removing odd lots. The NYSE big board also
displayed an increase at a negligible 1/100th of a percent. The majority of market share for
the IEX is in Tape A stocks similar to the results for IEX volume. Likewise for NYSE
American, their market share was dominated by Tape B stocks. The NYSE big board and
NASDAQ Book exchanges combine to account for roughly 30% of the market during this
sample period39.

39

This is roughly half of the typical amount of displayed market share based on recent years.
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Table 3 Results
The volume reported by IEX is slightly lower than was reported by CBOE Global
Markets. This is due to the number of broker self-cross that occurs on their exchange. Of
the 244.9 million shares traded on the IEX, 41.5 million were displayed order types and 34
million were routed orders.
Table 4 Results
The majority of aggregate fills executed by the IEX were fills under 100 shares in
size (73.634%). With the exception of trades between 100 and 199 shares, the average
percentage of fills decreases as the size of trades increases. Every data point except for
odd-lot-sized trades has a positive skewness indicating a potential for large positive outliers
in the dataset. As trade size increases, the level of positive skewness of the data also
increases. Under 1% of aggregates fills were made in block sizes or fills above 10,000
shares in size (0.083%).
Table 5 Results
The IEX handled 5.50% of their volume in block sizes during the sample period.
The majority of these trades were between 10,000 and 19,999 shares (5,762 trades). Only
a small number of trades exceeded 50,000 shares (252 trades). All block trade statistics had
a very high level of positive skewness indicating large positive outliers.
Table 6 Results
The IEX had a mean order size of 455 shares and a mean aggregate fill size of 175
shares. These values are roughly in line with many dark pools including the
IntelligentCross dark pool, which operates using an access delay40. The IEX trades an

40

Dark pool FINRA quarterly reports available at https://www.finra.org/filing-reporting/otctransparency/ats-quarterly-statistics
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average of 8122 stocks out of roughly 11,500 publicly listed companies41 in the U.S. and
this value has a considerable positive skewness (0.730). The first wave trade fill weight for
the IEX is 7.69% and this value has a high positive skewness since this value has increased
over the sample period. First wave fill percentage has a mean of 96.03% and this value has
very high negative skewness indicating negative outliers in the dataset.
Table 7 Results
Of all exchanges in the U.S. market system during the sample period, the IEX
(16.57%) ranked second behind the NASDAQ Book (29.248%) in their first wave fill
weights. When measuring the rankings of first wave fill rates, the IEX (98.638%) landed
in third place behind EDGX (99.111%) and BATS (98.862%). All fill rates had negative
skewness, likely due to time of volatility in the market. Smaller exchanges had large
positive skewness in their first wave fill weights.
Difference Tests Results
Table 8 Results
This table contains the results from a difference in means test between volumes for
each one of the four sample exchanges. Each exchange showed a statistically significant
difference in Tape A, Tape B, Tape C, and Total volume at the 1% level except for the
NASDAQ Book which did not show a statistically significant difference in Tape A volume
or Total volume. Of all the exchanges, the IEX had the lowest percent of odd-lots per share
of volume in Tape A, Tape B, Tape C, and Total volume.
Table 9 Results

41

Value taken from this article: https://www.benzinga.com/news/20/10/18026067/the-number-ofcompanies-publicly-traded-in-the-us-is-shrinking-or-is-it
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This table contains the results from a difference in means test between market share
for each one of the four sample exchanges. Market share is already a relative value because
it quantifies volume relative to total volume in the market so an extra calculation was not
required. The IEX showed a considerable increase in total market share (0.0579%) when
odd-lots were removed from the dataset. Both the NYSE big board (0.001%) and NYSE
American (-0.002) showed negligible change in total market share when odd-lots were
removed. The NASDAQ Book had the largest change (-0.920%) with nearly a 1% decrease
in total market share when removing odd-lots from the data.
Regression Results
Table 10 Results
This table reports the results for an ordinary least squares regression that uses
exchange volume as the dependent variable. The coefficient for the IEX alternates between
negative and positive and is only significant in Model B for odd-lots and non-odd-lots
regressions. NYSE American had negative and significant coefficients across the board.
Conversely, the NYSE big board and the NASDAQ Book both had positive, significant
coefficients both including and omitting odd-lots from the dependent variable. The
explanatory power of the model increases with more independent variables as shown by
the increase in r-squared values.
Table 11 Results
This table reports the results for an ordinary least squares regression that uses
market share as the dependent variable. The coefficient for the IEX is negative and
significant in every model. The coefficient for NYSE American is also negative and
significant across the board. Each model in each panel displays an increase in explanatory

68

power from the previous as indicated by the increases in r-squared. Conversely to the IEX
and NYSE American, the NYSE big board and NASDAQ Book exchanges both have
positive, significant coefficients in every model.
Panel A shows a comparable analysis to Table 10 because it only differs in that the
dependent variable is market share as opposed to volume. Panel B include First Wave
Weight because this variable is a proxy for the amount of liquidity that an exchange can
capture (Bishop, 2017). First Wave Weight is significant and positive for both Panel’s B
and C. Panel C adds an interaction variable to the analysis. The interaction variable
combines First Wave Weight with Total Volume to create a new explanatory variable. This
interaction variable describes the effect based on the combined changes in First Wave
Weight and Total Volume. In Panel C, the interaction variable is negative and significant.
It shows that market share decreases in cases where First Wave Weight and Total Volume
without odd-lots both increases.
Table 12 Results
This table reports the results for an ordinary least squares regression that uses IEX
volume as the in dependent variable. In Panel A, the dependent variable contains odd-lots
and all coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Panel B uses the dependent variable
without odd-lots. Independent variables in this analysis are market statistics about the IEX
that act as a proxy for a market trend. Odd-lot trade percentage is a proxy for HFT, order
size is useful for exchange comparisons, unique symbols traded is a proxy for market
involvement, block trade percentage is a proxy for investor time and dark pool competition,
and first wave weight is a proxy for liquidity.
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Panel A shows that the odd-lot percentage has a negative coefficient across each
model, except for in the final model that adds first wave weight. Order size flips between
negative and positive coefficients. Unique symbols traded and block trade percentage both
have positive coefficients across the board.
Panel B did not contain odd-lot trade percentage because the dependent variable
omits odd-lots. Order size was significant, but the last model was at the 5% level and not
the 1% level. Order size had negative and positive coefficients and carried the same signs
as in the prior panel. Unique symbols traded were all significant and positive across the
board. Block trade percentage were positive, but only significant in Model C. Finally, first
wave weight was positive and significant.
Table 13 Results
Table 14 replicates Table 13 using a new independent variable: market share
instead of volume. Each independent metric can be thought of in the same way as described
above. In Panel A, market share contains odd-lots and in Panel B odd-lots were omitted
from the dependent variable.
Panel A shows that the odd-lot percentage has negative coefficients across the
board and are all significant. The coefficient for order size differed from Table 13 in that
it was positive across the entire board. Order size coefficients were all statistically
significant. Unique symbols traded showed opposite results from the analysis in Table 13
using volume because all coefficients were negative. Similarly, block trade percentage was
negative across the board. Finally, first wave weight was not a large enough coefficient to
interpret. Unique symbols traded, block trade percentage, and first wave weight were all
significant.
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Auxiliary Hypotheses Data Analysis and Results
The empirical analysis and dataset discussed so far was unable to address some of
the auxiliary hypotheses that compared the emergence of IEX and NYSE American with
the BATS exchange. For reference, the following 3 sub-hypotheses look to test a timeseries analysis of the IEX and NYSE American:
Hypothesis 3b – Market share and volume has increased over time on IEX and NYSE
American
Hypothesis 3c – The market share of the IEX increased faster in its first year than the
market share of BATS did in its first year
Hypothesis 3d – The market share and volume of the NYSE American increased faster in
its first two years than the market share of BATS did in its first two years
Answering these hypotheses was simplest to do using an ordinary least squares
regression via a line of best fine on a scatterplot of the data. The following data was
collected and prepared separately from the primary dataset. Data was collected from the
CBOE by downloading a pre-formatted CSV file of all volume for every exchange from
the 2007-2020. After downloading this file, the data could be simply moved into SPSS for
analysis.
Preparing the data was slightly more challenging. First, the dates for the first day
of recorded traded needed to be identified manually in the data set. After discovering the
first day of trading for each exchange listed in the hypotheses the end date for each sample
was set 2 years following that date. Each sample date range then needed to be indexed into
numerical values so that the data could be divided and analyzed individually.
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Analyzing the data was a simple process. Once the data had been prepared, it was
transferred into SPSS. Through SPSS the data was plotted into a scatterplot for a single
exchange. Once the scatterplot was built, a line of best fit was calculated and added along
with the regression equation. A final note is that the BATS exchange emerged during the
2007-2008 recession which undoubtedly hurts the analysis overall. Due to this exogenous
event, the analysis was replicated for the first two years of trading beginning with the
official end of the recession.
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Graph 1 - IEX During First Two Years After Inception
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Graph 2 - NYSE American During First Two Years After Inception
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Graph 3 - BATS During First Two Years After Inception

76
Graph 4 - BATS During First Two Years After Inception (Non-Recession)

CONCLUSIONS

This research draws information from existing research and an empirical analysis
to show that the IEX fills a unique niche in the market system and has generally achieved
its goal of deterring HFT behavior. Based on the theory from O’Hara & Ye (2011) that
the market functions as one cohesive exchange with multiple points of entry, the IEX has
become yet another entry point. The IEX as an entry point to the market services many
investor types, but ultimately has grown to serve the function that a dark pool is intended
to create: protection for large orders for broker-dealers. Additionally, my findings show
that the IEX is effective in deterring HFT behavior so odd-lots volatility on the IEX is
less of a concern for retail investors.
The fact that access delay exchanges are permitted to interact with the NBBO in
a different way is naturally unfair, but does it create a significant advantage for the IEX?
The fact is that the IEX is truly a market response to the HFT problem. Every exchange
has access to the same rules that permit the IEX to function with an access delay. The
NYSE has implemented an access delay on NYSE American and found less success than
the IEX during a similar time period. Ultimately, the growth and success of the IEX can
certainly be somewhat attributed to their innovations and their initiative with the SEC to
admit their business model to the industry.
The IEX grown year over year in its market share and has been more successful in
its operation than its competitor, the NYSE American. The IEX has a significant portion
of aggregate fills in the odd-lots size, but has minimal slippage as trade size increases.
This could explain why IEX market share increases when accounting for HFT behavior
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on their exchange. Their ability to fill block-size routed orders speaks to their liquidity
provision as an exchange also. However, only 5.5% of their total volume is made in block
sizes. The exchange trades in 70-80% of the market in terms of symbols traded each year
so their market penetration could certainly improve in the years to come.
The IEX has found substantial success in the exchange design when analyzing
from the view of routed trades. The IEX ranks near the top of all exchanges in terms of
its first wave fill rate and first wave fill weight. These values indicate that the IEX
captures a high level of liquidity in the market despite having lower market share.
My findings show that the IEX is effective in deterring HFT behavior on their
exchange. In my first-difference analysis of the four sample exchanges, the IEX had the
lowest percent of odd-lots per share of volume in every category of stocks. Additionally,
their market share increased when accounting for odd-lots. This is even more substantial
given that roughly 73% of trades were made in odd-lots sizes on the IEX during the
sample period. Of each sample exchange, the IEX was the only exchange to show a
considerable increase in market share when accounting for odd-lots. This also supports
the conclusion that the IEX has become a niche for large trades to occur at a more
favorable price.
Volume on the IEX does not have considerable predictive power over volume in
the market. Compared to NYSE big board and the NASDAQ Book which both
significantly predict total volume. This confirms that using the NYSE big board and
NASDAQ book was a proper choice for comparing the IEX to the market. Market share
for the IEX on the other hand decreases relative to total volume in the sample period.
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This indicates that the IEX is less capable of handling moments of high volatility and that
volume moves off their exchange to larger venues at those times.
In every model, the first wave weight for exchanges has a positive relationship
with market share. This supports the claim that the IEX can capture liquidity better than
other exchanges despite low market share. When using interaction terms to analyze the
first wave weight with total volume, I discovered that first wave weight decreases when
volume increases. This indicates that less orders are routed during times of high volume.
The high value of first wave weight that the IEX has shows that it has created an effective
model using its access delay because it can capture a high amount of routed shares even if
volume is changing in the market.
The final model used in this analysis is highly insightful to the IEX. It reinforces
the deterrence of HFT as discovered in the difference tests because of the negative
coefficient for odd-lots. Volume increases on the IEX lead to more market penetration
and block share trade percentages. The first wave weight for the IEX has a positive
relationship with both volume and market share despite evidence that the IEX struggles
during times of volatility.
When using market share in the final model the results are mostly the same but
differ slightly. Odd-lot trade percentage has a negative relationship with market share
indicating again that the IEX deters HFT behavior. Order sizes on the IEX generally
increase with market share. This also supports the theory that the IEX has become a good
place for large trades to occur without slippage. Market share decreases, however,
relative to the number of symbols traded on the exchange. This indicates that core
investors who trade on the IEX may have a smaller risk appetite, or that the IEX has not
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been able to fully penetrate the available market. Block trades also have a negative
relationship with market share in this model. This counters the claim that the IEX is a
safe place for large trades to occur, but should be taken in context with the rest of the
analysis.
Overall, the IEX has been a topic of high emotion for the equity market. From the
passionate story told in Flash Boys to the intense debate between Brad Katsuyama and
William O’Brien, stakeholders in the market have become divided as fragmentation
continues for venues. Based on the available research and the analysis here,
fragmentation has generally good effects on the market. The IEX is another point of an
entry for the cohesive market system. Although the IEX has been seen as a proponent
against HFT, it is important to remember that AT differs from HFT. The market system
relies on AT to connect what has become such a fragmented system. Future analysis of
the IEX would benefit more targeted, event-based datasets to explore how the IEX
functions in the wake of changes in the market, regulation, or other phenomena.
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APPENDIX A: HISTORY OF MARKET FRAGMENTATION

“Pre-1995 — ‘Before the digital revolution, a handful of exchanges, including NYSE,
AMEX, NASDAQ, CBOE and the CME dominated the industry. Markets were highly
controlled, with nearly all orders executed on an exchange floor.’”

Source: Firm 58 via Business Insider

“1996 — ‘The SEC adopts Order Handling Rules, bringing the nascent electronic trading
markets into the national market system and making them accessible to the public.’”

Source: Firm 58 via Business Insider
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“2000 — ‘The maker-taker pricing model becomes the standard pricing model in US
equities markets.’”

Source: Firm 58 via Business Insider

“2003 — ‘Exchange interest in new pricing and billing models soars, with exchanges
creating more complex and frequently changing fee schedules.’”

Source: Firm 58 via Business Insider
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“2005 — ‘The SEC adopts Regulation NMS in August, requiring brokers to verify that
they have made an effort to execute their client's trade at the best possible price.’”

Source: Firm 58 via Business Insider

“2015 — ‘Markets have diversified to include 13 equities exchanges, 12 options exchanges
and 40 dark pools.’”

Source: Firm 58 via Business Insider
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APPENDIX B: BRIEF HISTORY OF ALGORITHMIC TRADING

“1851 - Paul Julius Reuter begins sending stock market quotations between London and
Paris via a cable beneath the English Channel, having previously deployed pigeons to carry
stock prices in Europe.
1990s - The rise of electronic marketplaces such as Archipelago, acquired by the New York
Stock Exchange, Island ECN, now a part of Nasdaq, and Globex at the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange enable algorithms to read market data and automatically execute trades.
2000 - Decimalization of US stock prices allows investors to buy and sell in penny
increments, cutting the price spreads that underpinned profit margins for market-makers and
encouraging traders to increase volumes to make up the difference.
Mid-2000s - Exchanges let traders pay to co-locate computers inside data centers, enabling
them to receive and act on market data faster than those outside.
2005 - Regulation National Market System in the US increases competition among stock
trading venues and turbocharges a race for the fastest technology between exchanges.
2010 - Spread Networks opens a fibre-optic link between New York and Chicago, reducing
round-trip latency to 13.3 milliseconds, or thousandths of a second. Speeds are soon
eclipsed by microwave networks that convey market data in about 8 milliseconds.
2012 - An electronic trading glitch causes Knight Capital to mistakenly purchase billions of
dollars of shares in 148 NYSE stocks, causing more than $400m in losses and precipitating
its takeover by Getco, a rival HFT company. The merged company, KCG Holdings, was later
acquired by Virtu Financial.
2018 - Go West to go live between Chicago and Tokyo, speeding the flow of futures-market
data over wireless towers, fiber-optic lines and submarine cables. It is a joint venture of big
trading firms such as DRW, IMC and Jump Trading.”42

42

This article was sourced via the University of Maine to access the Financial Times. That article may be
accessed here: https://search-proquest-com.wv-o-ursus-proxy02.ursus.maine.edu/docview/1992790298?pqorigsite=summon
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APPENDIX C: DATA COLLECTION CODE

The code below was written in Python and used to combine the CSV files
download from CBOE Global Markets. This program is described in greater detail in the
Methodology chapter.

import os, glob
import pandas as pd
path = '/Users/cam/PyCharmProjects/HistoricalCBOEDataAppend'
all_files = glob.glob(os.path.join(path, "market_history_*.csv"))
df_from_each_file = (pd.read_csv(f, sep=',') for f in all_files)
df_merged = pd.concat(df_from_each_file, ignore_index=True)
df_merged.to_csv("merged.csv")

import os, glob
import pandas as pd
path = '/Users/cam/PyCharmProjects/CBOEwithoddlots/Odd Lots
Volume CSV Files'
all_files = glob.glob(os.path.join(path, "mktshare_v_exc_*.csv"))
df_from_each_file = (pd.read_csv(f, sep=',') for f in all_files)
df_merged = pd.concat(df_from_each_file, ignore_index=True)
df_merged.to_csv("Odd Lots Volume.csv")
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The code below was written in python and used to manipulate the CSV files
download from CBOE Global Markets. It was used to separate Tape A from Tape B from
Tape C. This program is described in greater detail in the Methodology chapter.

import pandas as pd
df = pd.read_csv('Odd Lots Volume With TRFs.csv')
trf = df[(df['Trading Market Centre'] == 'NASDAQ TRF
Carteret')].index
df.drop(trf, inplace = True)
df.to_csv('Odd Lots No Carteret.csv')
df = pd.read_csv('Odd Lots No Carteret.csv')
trf = df[(df['Trading Market Centre'] == 'NYSE TRF')].index
df.drop(trf, inplace = True)
df.to_csv('Odd Lots No Carteret or NYSE.csv')
df = pd.read_csv('Odd Lots No Carteret or NYSE.csv')
trf = df[(df['Trading Market Centre'] == 'NASDAQ TRF
Chicago')].index
df.drop(trf, inplace = True)
df.to_csv('Odd Lots No TRFs.csv')
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The code below was written in python and used to organize the data after it was
combined and manipulated using the first two programs. This program is described in
greater detail in the Methodology chapter.

import pandas as pd
df = pd.read_csv('Odd Lots No TRFs.csv')
totalmv = df.groupby('Date')['% of Mkt'].sum().reset_index()
totalmv_tapea = df.groupby('Date')['Tape A'].sum().reset_index()
totalmv_tapeb = df.groupby('Date')['Tape B'].sum().reset_index()
totalmv_tapec = df.groupby('Date')['Tape C'].sum().reset_index()
totalms = df.groupby('Date')['Market'].sum().reset_index()
totalms_tapea = df.groupby('Date')['Tape A Market
Share'].sum().reset_index()
totalms_tapeb = df.groupby('Date')['Tape B Market
Share'].sum().reset_index()
totalms_tapec = df.groupby('Date')['Tape C Market
Share'].sum().reset_index()

dftotals = pd.DataFrame([totalmv['% of Mkt'],
totalmv_tapea['Tape A'],
totalmv_tapeb['Tape B'],
totalmv_tapec['Tape C'],
totalms['Market'],
totalms_tapea['Tape A Market Share'],
totalms_tapeb['Tape B Market Share'],
totalms_tapec['Tape C Market Share']])
dftotals = dftotals.transpose()
print(dftotals)
dftotals.to_csv('Odd Lots No Trfs Totals.csv')
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APPENDIX D: BASE RATES (IEX)

Base Fee
Codes

Executions at or Executions below
above $1.00
$1.00

Description

MI

Add non-displayed
liquidity

ML

$0.0009

0.30% of TDV

Add displayed liquidity

FREE

0.30% of TDV

TI

Remove non-displayed
liquidity

$0.0009

0.30% of TDV

TL

Remove displayed liquidity

$0.0006

0.30% of TDV

X

Opening Process for NonListed Securities (“Opening
Process”)

$0.0009

0.30% of TDV

Auction Match Fee

$0.0003

0.30% of TDV

O, C, H, P
Alpha

Routing and removing
liquidity (all routing
options)

Cost + $0.0001
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APPENDIX E: FEE CODE COMBINATIONS AND ASSOCIATED FEES (IEX)

Fee Codes Description

Fee

MI

Adds non-displayed liquidity

$0.0009

ML

Adds displayed liquidity

TI

Removes non-displayed liquidity

$0.0009

TL

Removes displayed liquidity

$0.0006

FREE

MIS

Member adds resting non-displayed liquidity that executes
against the Member’s removing interest

FREE

MLS

Member adds resting displayed liquidity that executes against
the Member’s removing interest

FREE

TIS

Member removes resting non-displayed liquidity added by
such Member

FREE

TLS

Member removes resting displayed liquidity added by such
Member

$0.0006

TIR1

Retail order removes non-displayed liquidity

FREE

MIA

Retail Liquidity Provider order adds non-displayed liquidity
that executes against a Retail order

FREE

TLR1

Retail order removes displayed liquidity

FREE

TISR

Retail order removes non-displayed liquidity added by such
Member

FREE

MISA

Retail Liquidity Provider order adds non-displayed liquidity to
a Retail order added by such Member

FREE

TLSR1

Retail order removes displayed liquidity added by such
Member

FREE

1

X

Opening Process for Non-Listed Securities ("Opening Process")

$0.0009

XD

Displayed interest resting on the Continuous Book executes in
the Opening Process

FREE

O

Opening Auction, IEX-listed security

OD
C
CD

Displayed interest resting on the Continuous Book executes in
the Opening Auction
Closing Auction, IEX-listed security
Displayed interest resting on the Continuous Book executes in
the Closing Auction

$0.0003
FREE
$0.0003
FREE

H

Halt or Volatility Auction, IEX-listed security

$0.0003

P

IPO Auction, IEX-listed security

$0.0003
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APPENDIX F: D-LIMIT ORDER TYPE OVERVIEW (IEX)

Source: IEX
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APPENDIX G: T-TESTS AGGREGATED

Odd-Lots Volume by Venue
HFT Proxy

NASDAQ

NYSE

NYSE American

IEX

Classification

Odd
Lots /
Volume

T-Stat

With Odd
Lots

Without Odd
Lots

Difference

Tape A

123,741,927

118,601,154

5,140,773

4.15%

21.91***

Tape B

22,731,102

22,276,583

454,519

2.00%

16.4***

Tape C

64,700,435

61,541,148

3,159,287

4.88%

12.01***

Market

211,173,465

202,418,885

8,754,580

4.15%

20.65***

Tape A

7,728,425

6,918,151

810,274

10.48%

3.57***

Tape B

15,058,628

14,431,443

627,185

4.16%

2.44***

Tape C

3,977,312

3,548,604

428,708

10.78%

3.11***

Market

26,764,365

24,898,198

1,866,167

6.97%

-5.5***

Tape A

607,218,125

549,192,212

58,025,913

9.56%

7.48***

Tape B

46,666,551

55,651,452

(8,984,901)

-19.25% 34.87***

Tape C

41,951,205

47,026,182

(5,074,977)

-12.10% 47.74***

Market

695,835,881

651,869,847

43,966,034

6.32%

-7.64***

Tape A

500,844,645

434,678,771

66,165,874

13.21%

0.85

Tape B

217,750,887

209,478,750

8,272,137

3.80%

-7.23***

Tape C

559,627,488

486,288,375

73,339,112

13.10%

2.56***

Market

1,278,223,019

1,130,445,896

147,777,123

11.56%

0.12
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Odd-Lots Market Share by Venue

NASDAQ

NYSE

NYSE American

IEX

Classification

HFT Proxy

Difference

T-Stat

3.420%

0.0949%

4.67***

1.435%

1.442%

0.0075%

-5.62***

Tape C

2.664%

2.741%

0.0767%

12.64***

Market

2.728%

2.786%

0.0579%

4.59***

Tape A

0.199%

0.192%

-0.0074%

8.67***

Tape B

0.955%

0.940%

-0.0151%

4.32***

Tape C

0.152%

0.148%

-0.0044%

17.02***

Market

0.330%

0.327%

-0.0020%

5.45***

Tape A

16.271%

15.914%

-0.3569%

37.38***

Tape B

2.947%

3.466%

0.5194%

66.12***

Tape C

1.684%

1.972%

0.2871%

71.69***

Market

8.921%

8.922%

0.0010%

16.07***

Tape A

13.259%

12.360%

-0.8991%

7.96***

Tape B

13.484%

13.338%

-0.1459%

4.06***

Tape C

21.960%

20.604%

-1.3563%

1.61*

Market

16.069%

15.149%

-0.9200%

4.23***

With Odd Lots

Without Odd Lots

Tape A

3.325%

Tape B
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